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Conformity and Dissent
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
Much of the time, human beings do what others do. This is perfectly sensible, because the
actions and statements of other people convey valuable information about what should be
done. In addition, most people want the good opinion of others, and this desire promotes
conformity. But conformity can lead both groups and institutions in unfortunate and even
catastrophic directions. The most serious problem is that by following others, people fail
to disclose what they know and believe, thus depriving society of important information.
Those who dissent, and who reject the pressures imposed by others, perform valuable
social functions, often at their own expense, material or nonmaterial. These points are
illustrated by reference to theoretical and empirical work on conformity, cascades, and
group polarization. An understanding of the role of conformity and dissent casts new
light on a variety of legal issues, including the expressive function of law; the institutions
of the American constitution; the functions of free speech in wartime; the debate over the
composition of the federal judiciary; and affirmative action in higher education.

“If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of expression, but
not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society which does not have it, I would
have no hesitation in judging that my own personal interest is better served by the first option.”1
“As soon as a person is in the midst of a group he is no longer indifferent to it. He may
stand in a wholly unequivocal relation to an object when alone; but as soon as a group and its
direction are present he ceases to be determined solely by his own coordinates. In some way he
refers the group to himself and himself to the group. He might react to the group in many
different ways; he might adopt its direction, compromise with it, or oppose it; he might even
decide to disregard it. But even in the latter instance (which superficially seems to be an ‘absence
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of group influence’) there is a clear and determined reference to the group as fully as in the
preceding cases.”2
“Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. . . . His was the mouth of a man who
knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . I have been perhaps most personally
affected by Justice Marshall as a raconteur . . . . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still
catch myself looking expectantly for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just
once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”3
“A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes
showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he said.”4
“[W]hile individual ideology and panel composition both have important effects on a
judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote than one’s own
ideology.”5

I. Introduction
How do people influence each other? What are the social functions of dissenters,
malcontents, and skeptics? How do the answers to these questions bear on law and
policy, and on the design of private and public institutions?
Consider some clues:
—A large number of judicial votes and decisions were investigated to see if it
matters whether a panel, on a federal court of appeals, includes two judges, or instead
three, appointed by a President of the same party.6 It is tempting to suggest that this
should not matter at all; two judges, after all, are able to produce a majority decision. But
this suggestion turns out to be wrong. A panel with three judges appointed by Republican
presidents is much more likely than a panel with two to reverse an environmental
decision at the behest of an industry challenger.7 A group of three like-minded judges
behaves very differently from a group with more diverse views. No less remarkably, a
single Democratic judge, sitting with two Republicans, turns out to be more likely to vote
2

Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 483 (1952).
See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217,
1217, 1220 (1992).
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See Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter Tales (Jean
Hersholt trans. 1948; originally published 1837).
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Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 1764
(1997).
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The statements in this paragraph are based on my independent research, presented below, and on Richard
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 1755 (1997). To
the same effect, see Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998) (finding that a panel of three Republican judges is far more likely to
reject agency action, in order to reach a conclusion that would be predicted of that panel on political
grounds, than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat).
7
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in favor of an industry challenge to a regulation than a single Republican, sitting with two
Democrats.8 It is not entirely wrong to conclude that when sitting with Republicans,
Democratic judges vote like Republicans, and that when sitting with Democrats,
Republican judges vote like Democrats. But this conclusion is itself misleading, because
how Democrats vote, and how Republicans vote, is very much dependent on whether
they are sitting with one or two judges appointed by presidents of the same party.9
—Ordinary citizens were asked to say, as individuals, how much a defendant
should be punished for specified misconduct.10 Their responses were measured on a scale
of 0 to 8, where 0 meant no punishment at all and 8 meant “extremely severe”
punishment.11 After recording their individual judgments, people were sorted into sixperson juries, which were asked to deliberate and to reach unanimous verdicts. When the
individual jurors favored little punishment, the group showed a "leniency shift," meaning
a rating that was systematically lower than the median rating of individual members
before they started to talk with one another.12 But when individual jurors favored strong
punishment, the group as a whole produced a "severity shift," meaning a rating that was
systematically higher than the median rating of individual members before they started to
talk.13 The direction and the extent of the shift were determined by the median ranking of
individual jurors, and because one or two dissenters from the majority view could shift
the median, they could make a significant difference.
My principal claim in this Article is that for each of us, conformity is often a
rational course of action, but when all or most of us conform, society can end up making
large mistakes. One reason we conform is that we often lack much information of our
own, and the decisions of others provide the best available information about what should
be done.14 The central problem is that widespread conformity deprives the public of
information that it needs to have. Conformists are often thought to be protective of social
interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group, while dissenters tend to be seen as
selfish individualists, embarking on projects of their own. But in an important sense, the
opposite is closer to the truth. In many situations, dissenters benefit others, while
conformists benefit themselves.
In a well-functioning democracy, institutions reduce the risks that accompany
conformity, in part because they meet conformity with dissent, and hence increase the
likelihood that more information will emerge, to the benefit of all. A high-level official
8

See id. at 1752.
Id. at 1752, 1754.
10
See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars, 100 Colum L
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Id. at 1152, 1154-55.
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See the discussion of imitation as a fast and frugal heuristic in Joseph Henrich et al., What Is the Role of
Culture in Bounded Rationality, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 343, 344 (Gerd Gigerenzer
and Richard Selten eds. 2002) (“Cultural transmission capacities allow individuals to shortcut the costs of
search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms, and instead benefit from the cumulative
experience stored in the minds (and observed in the behavior) of others.”).
9
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during World War II attributed the successes of the Allies, and the failures of Hitler and
the other Axis powers, to the greater ability of citizens in democracies to scrutinize and
dissent, and hence to improve past and proposed courses of action.15 Dissent and scrutiny
were possible because skeptics were not punished by the law and because informal
punishments, in the form of social pressures, were relatively weak. I will suggest that an
understanding of group influences, and their potentially harmful effects, casts new light
on a wide range of issues, including the nature of the American constitutional structure;
the functions of bicameralism; the sources of ethnic hostility and political radicalism; the
importance of civil liberties in wartime and during social panics and witch-hunts; the
performance of juries; the effects of diversity on the federal judiciary; affirmative action
in higher education; and the potentially large consequences of law even when it is never
enforced.
Throughout I focus on two influences on individual belief and behavior. The first
involves the information conveyed by the actions and statements of other people. If a
number of people seem to believe that some proposition is true, there is reason to believe
that that proposition is in fact true. Most of what we think—about facts, morality, and
law—is a product not of first-hand knowledge, but of what we learn from what others do
and think. This is true even though they too may be merely following the crowd. As we
shall see, this phenomenon can create serious problems for the system of precedent, as
when courts of appeals follow previous courts that are in turn following their
predecessors, creating a danger of widespread, self-perpetuating error. And of course
some people have more influence than others, simply because the decisions of those
people convey more information; we are especially likely to follow those who have
special expertise, those who seem most like us, those who fare best, or those whom we
otherwise have reason to trust.16
The second influence is the pervasive human desire to have and to retain the good
opinion of others. If a number of people seem to believe something, there is reason not to
disagree with them, at least not in public. The desire to maintain the good opinion of
others breeds conformity and squelches dissent, especially but not only in groups that are
connected by bonds of affection, which can therefore impair group performance. We
shall see that close-knit groups, discouraging conflict and disagreement, often do badly
for that very reason. In any case much of human behavior is a product of social
influences. For example, employees are far more likely to file suit if members of the
same workgroup have also done so17; teenage girls who see that other teenagers are
having children are more likely to become pregnant themselves18; the perceived behavior

15

See Luther Gulick, Administrative Reflections from World War II (1948). Irving Janis, Groupthink (2d
ed. 1985), can be seen as a generalization of this theme.
16
See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded Rationality, note
supra, at 174-76; Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, Norms and Bounded Rationality, in id. at 284-87.
17
See Harold H. Gardner, Nathan L. Kleinman, and Richard J. Butler, Workers’ Compensation and Family
and Medical Leave Act Claim Contagion, 20 J Risk and Uncertainty 89, 101-110 (2000)
18
See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277 (1996).

5

of others has a large effect on the level of violent crime19; broadcasters mimic one
another, producing otherwise inexplicable fads in programming20; lower courts
sometimes do the same, especially in highly technical areas, and hence judicial mistakes
may never be corrected.21
We should not lament social influences or wish them away. Much of the time,
people do better when they take close account of what others do. Some of the time, we
even do best to follow others blindly. But social influences also diminish the total level of
information within any group, and they threaten, much of the time, to lead individuals
and institutions in the wrong directions. Dissent can be an important corrective; many
groups and institutions have too little of it.22 As we shall see, conformists are free-riders,
whereas dissenters often confer benefits on others; and it is tempting to free-ride. As we
shall also see, social pressures are likely to lead groups of like-minded people to extreme
positions. When groups become caught up in hatred and violence, it is rarely because of
economic deprivation23 or primordial suspicions24; it is far more often a product of the
informational and reputational influences discussed here.25 Indeed, unjustified extremism
frequently results from a “crippled epistemology,” in which extremists react to a small
subset of relevant information, coming mostly from one another.26
Similar processes occur in less dramatic forms. Many large-scale shifts within
legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts are best explained by reference to social
influences. When a legislature suddenly shows concern with some formerly neglected
problem—for example, hazardous waste dumps or corporate misconduct—the concern is
often a product of conformity effects, not of real engagement with the problem. Of course
the new concern might be justified. But if social influences are encouraging people to
conceal information that they have, or if the blind are leading the blind, serious problems
are likely. There is a further point. With relatively small "shocks," similar groups can be
lead, by social pressures, to dramatically different beliefs and actions. When societies

19

See Edward Glaeser, E. Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman, Crime and Social Interactions, 111 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 507 (1996).
20
See Robert Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in
Prime-Time Television Programming, J. Industrial Economics (2002).
21
See Andrew F. Daughtety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am Law and Ec. Rev.
158 (1999).
22
Hence Mill’s claim that “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, stil more
than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for
truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth, produced by its collision with error.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,
On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government 85 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972)
23
See Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is
There a Causal Connection? (unpublished manuscript 2002).
24
See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J Legal
Stud 623, 648 (1998).
25
See Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 Harv J Law and Public
Policy 429 (2002).
26
See Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in Political Rationality and Extremism 3,
16 (Albert Breton et al. eds. 2002).
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differ, or when large-scale changes occur over time, the reason often lies not where we
usually look, but in small and sometimes elusive factors.27
An appreciation of informational influences, and of people’s concern for the good
opinion of others, helps to show how, and when, law can alter behavior without being
enforced—and merely by virtue of the signal that it provides.28 The central point here is
that law can provide reliable evidence both about what should be done and about what
most people think should be done. In either case, it can convey a great deal of relevant
information.29 Consider bans on public smoking and on sexual harassment. If people
think that the law is speaking for the view of most or all, potential violators are less likely
to engage in smoke or to engage in sexual harassment. Potential victims are also more
likely to take the steps to enforce the law privately, as, for example, through reminding
people of their legal responsibilities, and insisting that violators come into compliance. In
this light we can better understand the much-disputed claim that the law has an
“expressive function.”30 By virtue of that function, law can even stop or accelerate a
social cascade.31 Here too the areas of cigarette smoking and sexual harassment are
relevant examples. But if would-be violators are part of a dissident subcommunity, they
might well be able to resist law’s expressive effect; fellow dissidents can band together
and encourage one another to violate the law. Indeed, informational and reputational
factors can even encourage widespread noncompliance, as, for example, in drug use and
failure to comply with the tax laws.32 The law’s expressive power is partly a function of
its moral authority, and when law lacks that authority within a subcommunity, its signal
may be irrelevant or even counterproductive.
This Article is divided into seven parts. Parts II, III, and IV investigate social
science evidence involving, respectively, conformity, cascades, and group polarization. A
unifying theme is that in all three contexts, individuals are suppressing their private
signals—about what is true and what is right—and that this suppression can cause
significant social harm. Groups of like-minded people are especially vulnerable on this
count. Part V focuses on the expressive function of law and in particular on the
phenomenon of “compliance without enforcement.” Part VI catalogues some implications
27

See Joseph Henrich, What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded Rationality: The
Adaptive Toolbox 353-54 (2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with food choice decisions. For
example: “Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that
putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some
cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments. ” Id. at 353. See also Paul Omerod, Butterfly Economics
(1993), for a popular account.
28
See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in
Smoking Policy (Robert Rabin and Stephen Sugarman eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
29
See Richard McAdams, Norms Theory: An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Oregon L. Rev.
339 (2000).
30
Mathew Adler, Expressivist Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U Pa L Rev 1363 (2000);
Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, 60
Maryland L. Rev. 465 (2001).
31
See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev
607 (2000).
32
See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, in Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in
Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 78 (Robert Radin ed. 1999).
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of social influences for constitutionalism, judicial confirmations, and affirmative action in
higher education. Here I urge that the principal contribution of the framers of the
American Constitution lay not in their endorsement of deliberative democracy, but in
their insistence that diversity is an affirmative good, likely to improve deliberation. This
enthusiasm for diversity helps account for the systems of checks and balances and
federalism. I also suggest that it is important to attempt to provide a mix of views on the
federal bench; indeed, consideration should be given to increasing the likelihood that
panels, on courts of appeals, contain judges appointed by president of different parties. I
urge as well that in those cases in which racial diversity will improve discussion, it is
entirely legitimate for colleges and universities to attempt to promote racial diversity.
Part VII is a brief conclusion.
II.

Conformity and Independence

Why, and when, do people do what others do? To answer this question, we need
to distinguish between hard questions and easy ones. Intuition suggests that when people
are confident that they are right, they will be more willing to do what they think best and
to reject the views of the crowd. Several sets of experiments confirm this intuition, but
they also offer some significant twists. Most important, they suggest three points that I
will emphasize throughout:
1. Those who are confident and firm will have particular influence, and can lead
otherwise identical groups in dramatically different directions.33
2. People are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others and hence a
single dissenter, or voice of sanity, is likely to have a huge impact.34
3. If people are, by our lights, from some kind of “out group,” they are far less likely
to influence us, even on the simplest questions.35 And if people are part of a group
to which we also belong, they are far more likely to influence us, on both easy and
hard questions.36
My ultimate goal is to see how these points bear on the behavior of those involved
in making, enforcing, and interpreting law. But let us begin by reviewing some classic
studies.
A. Hard Questions

33

See p. below.
See p. below. Note a parallel finding: A minority is especially likely to have influence if it consists of
more than one person and if all members of the minority group are in basic agreement. See Robert Baron et
al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 81-82 (1999).
35
Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What to think By Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization and he
Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity, and Group Polarization, 29 British J. Soc. Psych. 97 (1990).
Group membership and self-categorization are emphasized in John Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social
Group: A Self-Categorization Theory 42-67 (1987).
36
Dominic Abrams et al., supra note, at 97-110.
34
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In the 1930s, the psychologist Muzafer Sherif conducted some simple
experiments on sensory perception.37 Subjects were placed in a very dark room and a
small pinpoint of light was positioned at some distance in front of them. Because of a
perceptual illusion, the light, which was actually stationary, appeared to move. On each
of several trials, Sherif asked people to estimate the distance that the light had moved.
When polled individually, subjects did not agree with one another, and their answers
varied from one trial to another. This is not surprising; because the light did not move,
any judgment about distance was a stab in the dark. But Sherif found some striking
results when subjects were asked to act in small groups. Here the individual judgments
converged and a group norm, establishing the right distance, quickly developed. Indeed,
the norm remained stable within groups across different trials, thus leading to a situation
in which different groups made, and were committed to, quite different judgments.38
There is an important clue here about how similar groups, indeed similar nations, can
converge on very different beliefs and actions simply because of modest and even
arbitrary variations in starting points.
When Sherif added a confederate—his own ally, unbeknownst to subjects—
something else happened.39 The judgment of the confederate, typically much higher or
much lower than those made by individual subjects, helped produced correspondingly
higher or lower judgments within the group. The large lesson is that at least in cases
involving difficult questions of fact, judgments “could be imposed by an individual who
had no coercive power and no special claim to expertise, only a willingness to be
consistent and unwavering in the face of others’ uncertainty.”40 Perhaps more remarkable
still, the group’s judgments became thoroughly internalized, so that subjects would
adhere to them even when reporting on their own, even a year later, and even when
participating in new groups whose members offered different judgments.41 The initial
judgments were also found to have effects across “generations.” In an experiment in
which fresh subjects were introduced and others retired, so that eventually all participants
were new to the situation, the original group judgment tended to stick, even after the
person who was originally responsible for it had been long gone.42
What accounts for these results? The most obvious answer points to the
informational influences produced by other people’s judgments. After all, the apparent
movements are a perceptual illusion, and the system of perception does not readily assign
distances to those movements. In those circumstances, people are especially likely to be
swayed by a confident and consistent group member. This finding has implications
outside of the laboratory and for classrooms, courtrooms, bureaucracies, and legislatures.
If uninformed people are trying to decide whether global warming is a serious problem,

37

Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes, 1 Sociometry 90 (1937). A good
outline can be found in Lee Ross and Richard Nisbet, The Person and the Situation 28-30 (1991).
38
Id. at 29.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 29-30.
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or whether they should be concerned about existing levels of arsenic in drinking water,
they are likely to be responsive to the views of confident and consistent others.43
What is true for factual issues is true for moral, political, and legal issues as well.
Suppose that a group of legislators is trying to decide how to handle a highly technical
issue. If a “confederate” is planted among the group, showing considerable confidence,
she is highly likely to be able to move the group in his preferred direction. So too if she is
not a confederate at all, but simply an ordinary legislator with great confidence on the
issue at hand. If judges are trying to resolve a complex issue on which they lack certainty,
they too are vulnerable to conformity effects.44 And for judicial panels as well, Sheriftype effects can be expected on technical matters if one judge is confident and seems
expert. The problem is that the so-called specialists may have biases and agendas of their
own, leading to large errors. Note that there is an important qualification to these claims,
to which I will return: Sherif’s conformity findings significantly decrease if the
experimenter uses a confederate whose membership in a different social group is made
salient to subjects.45
B. Easy Questions
But what if perception does provide reliable guidance? What if people have good
reason to know the right answer? The leading experiments, conducted by Solomon Asch,
explored whether people would be willing to overlook the apparently unambiguous
evidence of their own senses.46 In these experiments, the subject was placed into a group
of seven to nine people who seemed to be other subjects in the experiment but who were
actually Asch’s confederates. The simple task was to “match” a particular line, shown on
a large white card, to one of the three “comparison lines” that was identical to it in length.
The two non-matching lines were substantially different, with the differential varying
from an inch and three quarters to three quarters of an inch.
In the first two rounds of the Asch experiments, everyone agrees about the right
answer. “The discriminations are simple; each individual monotonously calls out the
same judgment.”47 But “suddenly this harmony is disturbed at the third round.”48 All
other group members make what is obviously, to the subject and to any reasonable
person, a clear error, matching the line at issue to one that is conspicuously longer or
shorter. In these circumstances, the subject, in all cases showing initial confusion and
disbelief at the apparent mistakes of others, has a choice: He can maintain his
independent judgment or instead accept the view of the unanimous majority. A large
43

See the discussion of authority in Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion 208-36
(1993). For evidence that minority views can be influential if they are held by consistent, confident people,
see Robert Bray et al., Social Influence By Group Members With Minority Opinions, 43 J Personality and
Social Psych. 78 (1982).
44
See section below.
45
Abrams, supra note, at 99-104.
46
See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal
13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).
47
Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 453 (1952).
48
Asch, Opinion and Social Pressures, supra note, at 13.
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number of people end up yielding at least once in a series of trials. When asked to decide
on their own, subjects erred less than 1 percent of the time; but in rounds in which group
pressure supported the incorrect answer, subjects erred 36.8% of the time.49 Indeed, in a
series of twelve questions, no less than 70% of subjects went along with the group, and
defied the evidence of their own senses, at least once.50 Conformity experiments of this
kind have now produced 133 total sets of results from seventeen countries, including
Zaire, Germany, France, Japan, Lebanon, and Kuwait.51 A meta-analysis of these studies
uncovers a variety of refinements on Asch’s basic findings, but his basic conclusion has
held up. For all results, the mean percentage error is 29%.52 People in some nations, with
“conformist” cultures, do err more than people in other nations, with more “individualist”
cultures.53 The variations are real, but the overall pattern of errors—with subjects
conforming between 20% and 40% of the time—does not show huge differences across
nations.
Note that Asch’s findings contain two conflicting lessons. First, a significant
number of people are independent all or much of the time. About 25% of people are
consistently independent,54 and about two-thirds of total individual answers do not
conform. Hence “there is evidence of extreme individual differences” in susceptibility to
group influences, with some subjects remaining completely independent, and others
“going with the majority without exception.”55 While independent subjects “present a
striking spectacle to an observer,” giving “the appearance of being unshakable,”56 other
people show a great deal of anxiety and confusion.57 Second, most subjects, at least some
of the time, are willing to yield to the group even on an apparently easy question on
which they have direct and unambiguous evidence. For present purposes, the latter
finding is the most important.
C. Reasons and Blunders
Why do people sometimes ignore the evidence of their own senses? The two
principal explanations involve information and peer pressure. Some of Asch’s subjects
seem to have thought that the unanimous confederates must be right; but other people,
though believing that group members were unaccountably mistaken, were unwilling to
make, in public, what those members would see as an error. In Asch’s own studies,
several conformists said, in private interviews, that their own opinions must have been
wrong58—a point that suggests that information, rather than peer pressure, is what was
49

Id. at 16.
Id.
51
See Rod Bond and Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s Line
Judgment Task, 119 Psych. Bulletin 111, 116 (1996).
52
Id. at 118.
53
Id. at 128.
54
Ronald Friend et al., A Puzzling Misinterpretation of the Asch “Conformity” Study, 20 European J of
Social Psych 29, 37 (1990).
55
Solomon Asch, Social Psychology, supra note, at 457-58.
56
Id. at 466.
57
Id. at 470.
58
See Asch, supra.
50
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moving them.59 This informational account is strengthened by one study in which people
recorded their answers anonymously but gave nearly as many wrong answers as they had
under Asch’s own conditions.60 A similar study finds that conformity is not lower when
the subject’s response is unavailable to the majority.61 On the other hand, these are
unusual results, and experimenters generally find significantly reduced error, in the same
basic circumstances as Asch’s experiments, when the subject is asked to give a purely
private answer.62 In the same way, easily identifiable conformity or deviation has been
found to produce higher conformity.63 These findings suggest that peer pressure matters
as well.
Asch’s own conclusion was that his results raised the possibility that “the social
process is polluted” by the “dominance of conformity.”64 He added, “That we have found
the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and wellmeaning young people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern.”65 As I have
noted, Asch’s experiments produce broadly similar findings across nations, and so in
Asch’s sentence just quoted, the word “society” could well be replaced with the word
“world.” But I want to stress another point here: Many people are not willing to disclose
their own information to the group, even though it is in the group’s interest, most of the
time, to learn what it is known or thought by individual members. To see this point,
imagine a group almost all of whose members believe something to be true even though
it is false. Imagine too that one member of the group, or a very few members of the
group, know the truth. Are they likely to correct the dominant view? If Asch’s findings
generalize, the answer is that they may not be. They are not reticent because they are
irrational. They are making is a perfectly sensible response to the simple fact that the
dominant view is otherwise—a fact that suggests either that the small minority is wrong
or that they are likely to risk their own reputations if they insist that they are right. As we
shall see, Asch’s findings help explain why groups can end up making unfortunate and
even self-destructive decisions.
Would those findings apply to judgments about morality, policy, and law? It
seems jarring to think that people would yield to a unanimous group when the question
involves a moral, political, or legal issue on which they have great confidence. But if
Asch is correct, such yielding should be expected, at least some of the time. We will find
powerful evidence that this happens within federal courts of appeals.66 The deadening
effect of public opinion was of course a central concern of John Stuart Mill, who insisted
that protection “against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough,” and that it was also
important to protect “against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the
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tendency of society to impose, by other mans than civil penalties, its own ideas and
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . .”67 Mill’s focus here is
on the adverse effects of coerced conformity not only on the individuals who are thus
tyrannized, but also on society itself, which is deprived of important information.68
D. How To Increase (or Decrease) Conformity
What factors increase or decrease conformity? Consistent with Sherif’s findings,
people are less likely to conform if they have high social status or are extremely
confident about their own views.69 They are more likely to conform if the task is difficult
or if they are frightened.70 Consider also the following:
1. Financial rewards for correct answers affect performance, and in two different
ways.71 When people stand to make money if they are right, the rate of conformity is
significantly decreased in the same basic condition as the Asch experiments, if the task is
easy. People are less willing to follow group members when they stand to profit from a
correct answer. But there is a striking difference when the experiments are altered to
make the underlying task difficult. In that event, a financial incentive, rewarding correct
answers, actually increases conformity. People are more willing to follow to crowd when
they stand to profit from a correct answer if the question is hard. Perhaps most strikingly,
the level of conformity is about the same, when financial incentives were absent, in lowdifficulty and high-difficulty tasks—but the introduction of financial rewards splits the
results on those tasks dramatically apart, with significantly decreased conformity for lowdifficulty tasks and significantly-increased conformity for high-difficulty tasks.72
These results have simple explanations. A certain number of people, in the Asch
experiments, actually know the right answer, and give conforming answers only because
it is not worthwhile to reject the shared view of others in public. But when a financial
incentive is offered, peer pressure is outweighed by the possibility of material gain. The
simple lesson here is that an economic reward can counteract the effects of social
pressures. By contrast, difficult tasks leave people with a great deal of uncertainty about
whether they are right. In such circumstances, people are all the more likely to give
weight to the views of others, simply because those views are the most reliable source of
information. Consider in this regard the parallel finding that people’s confidence in their
own judgments is directly related to the confidence shown by the experimenter’s
confederates.73 When the confederates act with confidence and enthusiasm, subjects also
show heightened confidence in their judgments, even when they were simply following
the crowd. Consider also the general claim that imitation of most other people can
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operate as a kind of fast and frugal heuristic, one that works well for many creatures,
including human beings, in a wide variety of settings.74 Like most heuristics, the
imitation heuristic, while generally sensible and often the best available, also produces
errors in many situations.75
There is a disturbing implication. A “majority consensus” is “often capable of
misleading individuals into inaccurate, irrational, or unjustified judgments.” Such a
consensus “can also produce heightened confidence in such judgments as well.” 76 It
follows that “so long as the judgments are difficult or ambiguous, and the influencing
agents are united and confident, increasing the importance of accuracy will heighten
confidence as well as conformity—a dangerous combination.”77 The point very much
bears on the sources of unjustified extremism, especially under circumstances in which
countervailing information is unavailable.78 The same point helps explain group
influences within the federal courts.79
2. Asch’s original studies found that varying the size of the group of confederates,
unanimously making the erroneous decision, mattered only up to a number of three;
increases from that point had little effect.80 Using one confederate did not increase
subjects’ errors at all; using two confederates increased errors to 13.6%; and using from
three confederates increased error to 31.8%, not substantially different from the level that
emerged from further increases in group size. But Asch’s own findings appear unusual on
this count. Subsequent studies have found that, contrary to Asch’s own findings,
increases in the size of the group of confederates usually do increase conformity.81
More significantly, a modest variation in the experimental conditions made all the
difference: the existence of at least one compatriot, or voice of sanity, dramatically
reduced both conformity and error. When one confederate made a correct match, errors
were reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a strong majority the other way.82 There
is a clear implication here: If a group is embarking on an unfortunate course of action, a
single dissenter might be able to turn it around, by energizing ambivalent group members
who would otherwise follow the crowd. It follows that affective ties among members,
making even a single dissent less likely, might well undermine the performance of groups
and institutions. Consider here a study of the performance of investment clubs—small
groups of people who pool their money to make joint decisions about stock market
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investments.83 The worst-performing clubs were built on affective ties and primarily
social; the best-performing clubs limited social connections and were focused on
increasing returns. Dissent was far more frequent in the high-performing clubs. The low
performers usually had unanimous votes, with little open debate. The problem is that the
votes in low performing groups were “cast to build social cohesion rather than to make
the best financial choice.”84 In short, conformity resulted in significantly lower returns.
3. Much depends on the subject’s perceived relationship to the experimenters’
confederates and in particular on whether the subject considers himself part of the same
group in which those confederates fall. If the subject identified himself as a member of a
different group from the majority, the conformity effect is greatly reduced.85 People are
especially likely to conform when the group consists of people whom subjects like or
admire, or otherwise identify with.86 The general point explains why group membership
is often emphasized by those who seek to increase or decrease the influence of a certain
point of view. Perhaps an advocate can be discredited, without the relevant group, by
showing that he is a “conservative” or a “liberal,” prone to offer unacceptable views.
Thus conformity—and hence error—is dramatically increased, in public
statements, when the subject perceives himself as part of a reasonably discrete group that
includes the experimenter’s confederates (all, like himself, psychology majors, for
example).87 By contrast, conformity is dramatically decreased, and hence error is also
dramatically decreased, in public statements when the subject perceives himself as in a
different group from the experimenter’s confederates (all but himself ancient history
majors, for example).88 Notably, private opinions, expressed anonymously afterwards,
were about the same whether or not the subject perceived himself as a member of the
same group as others in the experiment. And people who thought that they were members
of the same group as the experimenter’s confederates gave far more accurate answers,
and far less conforming answers, when they were speaking privately.89 In the real world,
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would-be dissenters might silence themselves partly when and because they trust group
members to be right, partly because they do not want to risk the opprobrium of likeminded others, and partly because they fear that they will, through their dissent, weaken
the effectiveness and reputation of the group to which they belong. There is a large lesson
here. Publicly expressed statements, showing agreement with a majority view, may be
both wrong and insincere, especially when relevant speakers identify themselves as
members of the same group as the majority.90 The finding of heightened conformity is
linked with evidence of poor performance by groups whose members are connected by
affective ties; in such groups, people are less likely to say what they know and more
likely to suppress disagreement. A system of checks and balances, attempting to ensure
that ambition will check ambition,91 can be understood as a way of increasing the
likelihood of dissent, and of decreasing the likelihood that members of any particular
group, or institution, will be reluctant to disclose what they think and know.92
E. Shocks, Authority, and Expertise
In the Sherif and Asch experiments, no particular person has special expertise. No
member of the group shows unusual measurement abilities or wonderful eyesight. But we
might safely predict that subjects would be even more inclined to blunder if they had
reason to believe that one or more of the experimenters’ confederates was particularly
likely to be correct. This hypothesis receives support from a possible interpretation of one
of the most alarming findings in modern social science, involving conformity not to the
judgments of peers, but to the will of an experimenter.93 These experiments are of
independent interest, because they have implications for social influences on judgments
of morality, not merely facts.
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The experiments, conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram, ask people to
administer electric shocks to a person sitting in an adjacent room.94 Subjects are told,
falsely, that the purpose of the experiment is to test the effects of punishment on memory.
Unbeknownst to the subject, the victim of the electric shocks is a confederate and there
are no real shocks. The apparent shocks are delivered by a simulated shock generator,
offering thirty clearly delineated voltage levels, ranging from 15 to 450 volts,
accompanied by verbal descriptions ranging from “Slight Shock” to “Danger: Severe
Shock.”95 As the experiment unfolds, the subject is asked to administer increasingly
severe shocks for incorrect answers, to and past the “Danger: Severe Shock” level, which
begins at 400 volts.
In Milgram’s original experiments, the subjects included forty men between the
ages of 20 and 50. They came from a range of occupations, including engineers, high
school teachers, and postal clerks.96 They were paid $4.50 for their participation—and
also told that they could keep the money no matter how the experiment went. The
“memory test” involved remembering word pairs; every mistake, by the
confederate/victim, was to be met by an electric shock and a movement to one higher
level on the shock generator. To ensure that everything seems authentic, the subject is, at
the beginning of the experiment, given an actual sample shock at the lowest level. But the
subject is also assured that the shocks are not dangerous, with the experimenter declaring,
in response to a prearranged question from the confederate, “Although the shocks can be
extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage.”97
In the original experiments, the victim does not make any protest until the 300volt shock, which produces a loud kick, by the victim, on the wall of the room where he
is bound to the electric chair. After that point, the victim does not answer further
questions, and is heard from only after the 315-volt shock, when he pounds on the wall
again—and is not heard from thereafter, even with increases in shocks to and past the
400-volt level. If the subject indicates an unwillingness to continue, the experimenter
offers prods of increasing firmness, from “Please go on” to “You have no other choice;
you must go on.”98 But the experimenter has no power to impose sanctions on subjects.
Most people predict that in such studies, over 95% of subjects would refuse to
proceed to the end of the series of shocks. When people are asked to make predictions
about what people would do, the expected breakoff point is “Very Strong Shock,”99 of
195 volts. But in Milgram’s experiment, every one of the forty subjects went beyond 300
volts. The mean maximum shock level was 405 volts; and a strong majority—26 of 40, or
65%—went to the full 450-volt shock, two steps beyond “Danger: Severe Shock.” 100
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Later variations on the original experiments produced even more remarkable
results. In those experiments, the victim expresses a growing level of pain and distress as
the voltage increases.101 Small grunts are heard from 75 volts to 105 volts, and at 120
volts, the subject shouts, to the experimenter, that the shocks were starting to become
painful. At 150 volts, the victims cries out, “Experimenter, get me out of here! I won’t be
in the experiment any more! I refuse to go on!”102 At 180 volts, the victim says, “I can’t
stand the pain.” At 270 volts he responds with an agonized scream. At 300 volts he
shouts that he will no longer answer the questions. At 315 volts he screams violently. At
330 volts and after, he is not heard. In this version of the experiment, there is no
significant change in Milgram’s results: 25 of 40 participants went to the maximum level,
and the mean maximum level was over 360 volts. In a somewhat gruesome variation, the
victim says, before the experiment begins, that he has a heart condition, and his pleas to
discontinue the experiment include repeated reference to the fact his heart is “bothering”
him as the shocks continue.103 This too did not lead subjects to behave differently.104
Milgram himself explains his results as showing obedience to authority, in a way
reminiscent of the behavior Germans under Nazi rule; and indeed Milgram was partly
motivated by the goal of understanding how the Holocaust could have happened.105
Milgram concluded that ordinary people will follow orders even if the result is to produce
great suffering in innocent others. Undoubtedly simple obedience is part of the picture.
But there is another explanation.106 Subjects who are invited to an academic setting, to
participate in an experiment run by an apparently experienced scientist, might well defer
to the experimenters’ instructions in the belief that the experimenter is likely to know
what should be done, all things considered. If the experimenter asks subjects to proceed,
most subjects might believe, not unreasonably, that the harm apparently done to the
victims is not serious and that the experiment actually has significant benefits for society.
On this account, the experimenter has special expertise. If this is right, then the
participants in the Milgram experiments might be seen as similar to those in the Asch
experiments, with the experimenter having a greatly amplified voice. And on this
account, many of the subjects might have put their moral qualms to one side, not because
of blind obedience, but because of a judgment that those qualms are likely to have been
ill-founded. That judgment might be based in turn on a belief that the experimenter is not
likely to ask subjects to proceed if the experiment is truly objectionable.
In short, Milgram’s subjects might be responding to an especially loud
informational signal—the sort of signal sent by a specialist or a crowd. And on this view,
Milgram was wrong to draw an analogy between the behavior of his subjects and the
behavior of Germans under Hitler. His subjects were not simply obeying a leader, but
responding to someone whose credentials and good faith they thought they could trust. Of
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course it is not simple, in theory or in practice, to distinguish between obeying a leader
and accepting the beliefs of an expert. The only suggestion is that the obedience of
subjects was hardly baseless; it involved a setting in which subjects had some reason to
think that the experimenter was not asking them to produce serious physical harm out of
sadism or for no reason at all.
A subsequent study, exploring the grounds of obedience, offers support for this
claim.107 In that study, a large number of subjects watched the tapes of the Milgram
experiments, and were asked to rank possible explanations for compliance with the
experimenter’s request. Deference to expertise was the highest-rank option. This is not
definitive, of course, but an illuminating variation on the basic experiment, by Milgram
himself, provides further support.108 In this variation, the subject is among three people
asked to administer the shocks, and two of those people, actually confederates, refuse to
go past a certain level (150 volts for one and 210 volts for the other). In such cases, the
overwhelming majority of subjects—92.5%—defy the experimenter.109 This was by far
the most effective of Milgram’s many variations on his basic study, all designed to
reduce the level of obedience.110
Why was the defiance of peers so potent? I suggest that the subjects, in this
variation, were very much like those subjects who had at least one supportive confederate
in Asch’s experiments. One such confederate led Asch’s subjects to say what they saw;
so too, peers who acted on the basis of conscience freed Milgram’s subject to follow their
consciences as well. Milgram himself established, in yet another variation, that without
any advice from the experimenter, and without any external influences at all, the
subject’s moral judgment was clear: do not administer shocks above a very low level.111
Indeed that moral judgment had nearly the same degree of clarity, to Milgram’s subjects,
as the clear and correct factual judgments made by Asch’s subjects when they were
deciding about the length of lines on their own (and hence not confronted with Asch’s
confederates). In Mailgram’s experiments, it was the experimenter’s own position—that
the shocks should continue and that no permanent damage would be done—that had a
high degree of influence, akin to the influence of the Asch’s unanimous confederates. But
when the subject’s peers rejected the position of Milgram’s experimenter, the
informational content of that position was effectively negated by the information
presented by the refusals of peers. Hence subjects could rely on their own moral
judgments, or even follow the moral signals indicated by the peers’ refusals.
The general lessons are not obscure. When the morality of a situation is not clear,
people might well be influenced by someone who seems to be a expert, able to weigh the
risks involved. But when the expert’s questionable moral judgment is countered by
reasonable people, who bring their own moral judgments to bear, most people are
unlikely to follow experts. They are far more likely to do as their conscience dictates. As
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we shall see, compliance with law has similar features. A legal pronouncement about
what should be done will often operate in the same way as an expert judgment about what
should be done. It follows that people will follow the law even when it is hardly ever
enforced—and even if they would otherwise be inclined to question the judgment that the
law embodies. But if peers are willing to violate the law, violations may become
widespread, especially but not only if people think that the law is enjoining them from
doing something that they wish to do, either for selfish reasons or for reasons of
principle. In this way, Milgram’s experiments offer some lessons about when law will be
ineffective unless vigorously enforced—and also about the preconditions for civil
disobedience.
III. Cascades
I now examine how informational and reputational influences can produce social
cascades—large-scale social movements in which many people end up thinking
something, or doing something, because of the beliefs or actions of a few early movers.
As in the case of conformity, participation in cascades is fueled by social influences. But
where the idea of conformity helps to explain social stability, an understanding of
cascades helps to explain social and legal movements, which can be stunningly rapid, and
which can also produce situations that are highly unstable.
Cascades can involve judgments about facts or values. They operate within
legislatures and the judicial system as well as within groups of citizens. And when people
have affective connections with one another, the likelihood of cascades increases. In the
area of social risks, cascades are especially common, with people coming to fear certain
products and processes not because of private knowledge, but because of the apparent
fears of others.112 The system of legal precedent also produces cascades, as early
decisions lead later courts to a certain result, and eventually most or all courts come into
line, not because of independent judgments, but because of a decision to follow the
apparently informed decisions of others.113 The sheer level of agreement will be
misleading if most courts have been influenced, even decisively influenced, by their
predecessors, especially in highly technical areas.
By themselves cascades are neither good nor bad. It is possible that the underlying
processes will lead people to sound decisions about risks, morality, or law. The problem,
a serious one, is that people may well converge, through the same processes, on
erroneous or insufficiently justified outcomes. But to say this is to get ahead of the story;
let us begin with the mechanics.
A. Informational Cascades: The Basic Phenomenon
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In an informational cascade, people cease relying, at a certain point, on their
private information or opinions. They decide instead on the basis of the signals conveyed
by others. Once this happens, the subsequent actions, made by few or many others, add
no new information. It follows that the behavior of the first few actors can, in theory,
produce similar behavior from countless followers. A particular problem arises if people
think that the large number of people who say or do something are acting on independent
knowledge; this can make it very hard to stop the cascade.
1. A simple illustration. Begin with a stylized example, and suppose that doctors
are deciding whether to prescribe hormone therapy for menopausal women. If hormone
therapy creates significant risks of heart disease, its net value, let us assume, is –1; if it
does not create such risks, its net value is +1.114 Let us also assume that the doctors are in
a temporal queue, and each doctor knows his place on that queue. From his own
experience, each doctor has some private information about what should be done. But
each doctor also cares, rationally, about the judgments of others. Anderson is the first to
decide, and prescribes hormone therapy if his judgment is low risk but declines if his
judgment is high risk. Suppose that Anderson prescribes. Barber now knows that
Anderson’s judgment was low risk and that she too should certainly urge hormone
therapy if she makes that independent judgment. But if her independent judgment is that
the risk is high, she would—if she trusts Anderson no more and no less than she trusts
herself—be indifferent about whether to prescribe, and might simply flip a coin.
Now turn to a third doctor, Carlton. Suppose that both Anderson and Barber have
prescribed hormone therapy, but that Carlton’s own information suggests that the risk is
high. In that event, Carlton might well ignore what he knows and prescribe the therapy. It
is likely, in these circumstances, that both Anderson and Barber saw a low risk, and
unless Carlton thinks that his own information is better than theirs, he should follow their
lead. If he does, Carlton is in a cascade. To the extent that Carlton is not acting on the
basis of his own information, and to the extent that subsequent doctors know what others
have done and why, they will do exactly what Carlton did: prescribe hormone therapy
regardless of their private information. “Since opposing information remains hidden,
even a mistaken cascade lasts forever. An early preponderance toward either adoption or
rejection, which may have occurred by mere coincidence or for trivial reasons, can feed
upon itself . . .”115
Notice that the serious problem here lies in the fact that for those in a cascade,
actions do not disclose privately held information. In the example just given, doctors’
actions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of the health
consequences of hormone therapy—even if the information held by individual doctors, if
actually revealed and aggregated, would give a quite accurate picture of the situation. The
reason for the problem is that individual doctors are following the lead of those who
came before. As noted, this problem is aggravated if subsequent doctors overestimate the
extent to which their predecessors relied on private information and did not merely
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follow those who came before. If this is so, subsequent doctors might fail to rely on, and
fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the information collectively held
by those who started the cascade. The problem here is that the medical profession
generally will lack information that it needs to have. Participants in cascades act
rationally in suppressing their private information, whose disclosure would benefit the
group more than the individual who has it.116 The failure to disclose private information
therefore presents a free-rider problem. To overcome that problem, some kind of
institutional reform seems to be necessary.
Of course cascades do not always develop, and of course they usually do not last
forever. Often people have, or think that they have, enough private information to reject
the accumulated wisdom of others. Medical specialists sometimes fall in this category.
When cascades develop, they might be broken by corrective information, as has
apparently happened in the case of hormone replacement therapy itself.117 In the domain
of science, peer-reviewed work provides a valuable safeguard. But even among
specialists and indeed doctors, cascades are common. “Most doctors are not at the cutting
edge of research; their inevitable reliance upon what colleagues have done and are doing
leads to numerous surgical fads and treatment-caused illnesses.”118 Thus an article in the
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine explores “bandwagon diseases” in which
doctors act like “lemmings, episodically and with a blind infectious enthusiasm pushing
certain diseases and treatments primarily because everyone else is doing the same.”119
Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy, “seem to have been adopted initially
based on weak information,” and extreme differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and
other procedures) provide good evidence that cascades are at work.120 And once several
doctors join the cascade, it is liable to spread. There is a link here with Sherif’s
experiments, showing the development of divergent but entrenched norms, based on
group processes in areas in which individuals lack authoritative information. In fact,
prescriptions of hormone replacement therapy were fueled by cascade-like processes.121
What is true for doctors is highly likely to be true for lawyers, engineers,
legislators, bureaucrats, judges, investors,122 and academics123 as well. It is easy to see
how cascades might develop among groups of citizens, especially but not only if those
groups are small, insulated, and connected by affective ties. If Barry does not know
whether global warming is a serious problem, and if Alberta insists that it is, Barry might
well be persuaded, and their friend Charles is likely to go along, making it unlikely that
Danielle will be willing to reject the shared judgment of the developing group. When
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small communities of like-minded people end up fearing a certain risk, or fearing and
hating another group, cascades are often responsible.
2. Precedential cascades. Consider a legal analogue124: There is a disputed issue
under the Endangered Species Act. The first court of appeals to decide the question finds
the issue genuinely difficult, but resolves the issue favorably to the government. The
second court of appeals favors, very slightly, the view that the government is wrong, but
the holding of another circuit is enough to tip the scales in the government’s favor. A
third court of appeals is also slightly predisposed to rule against the government, but it
lacks the confidence to reject the shared view of two circuits. Eventually all circuits come
into line, with the final few feeling the great weight of the unanimous position of others,
and perhaps insufficiently appreciating the extent to which that weight is a product of an
early and somewhat idiosyncratic judgment. Because the courts of appeals are in
agreement, the Supreme Court denies certiorari.
To be sure, precedential cascades do not always happen, and splits among courts
of appeals are common.125 One reason is that subsequent courts often have sufficient
confidence to conclude that predecessor courts have erred. But it is inevitable that
cascades will sometimes develop, especially in highly technical areas, and it will be hard
to detect them after they have occurred. The prescriptive implication is clear: Judicial
panels should be cautious about giving a great deal of weight to the shared view of two or
more courts of appeals. A patient who seeks a second opinion does well not to disclose
the first opinion to his new doctor, so as to ensure independence; so too, a court of
appeals should be alert to the possibility that the unanimity of previous courts does not
reflect independent agreement. And when the Supreme Court rejects the unanimous view
of a large number of courts of appeals, a precedential cascade might well have been
responsible for the unanimity.126 For the legal system, the danger is that a cascade,
producing agreement among the lower courts, might prove self-insulating as well as selfreinforcing. Unless there is clear error, why should the Supreme Court become involved?
3. Rationality and error. In informational cascades as discussed thus far, each
participant is being entirely rational; they are acting as they should in the face of limited
information. But as I have suggested, it is possible that participants in the cascade will
fail to see the extent to which the decisions of their predecessors carry little independent
information. If most scientists think that global warming is a serious problem, can they
really be wrong? A possible answer is that they might indeed be wrong, especially if they
are not relying on their private information and are following the signals sent by other
people. And people often seem to mistake a cascade for a series of separate and
independent judgments. In 2001, for example, hundreds of law professors signed a
statement condemning, on constitutional grounds, President Bush’s decision to permit
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.127 The sheer number of signatures seems
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extremely impressive. But it is perhaps less so if we consider the likelihood that most
signatories lacked reliable information on the esoteric legal issue in question, and were
simply following the apparently reliable but actually uninformative judgment of
numerous others.
Despite the rationality of those who participate in informational cascades, there is
a serious risk of error. People might easily converge on an erroneous, damaging, or
dangerous path, simply because they are failing to disclose and to act on the basis of all
the information that they have.128
4. Laboratory evidence. Cascades are easy to create in laboratory settings. Some
of the experiments are detailed and a bit technical, but four general lessons are clear.
First, people will often neglect their own private information and defer to the information
provided by their predecessors. Second, people are alert to whether their predecessors are
especially informed; more informed people can shatter a cascade. Third, and perhaps
most intriguingly, cascade effects are greatly reduced if people are rewarded not for
correct individual decisions, but for correct decisions by a majority of the group to which
they belong. Fourth, cascade effects, and blunders, are significantly increased if people
are rewarded not for correct decisions, but for decisions that conform to the decisions
made by most people. As we shall see, these general lessons have implications for
institutional design. They suggest that errors are most likely when people are rewarded
for conforming, and least likely when people are rewarding for helping groups and
institutions to decide correctly.
The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the experiment was
using Urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or Urn B, which contained
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two white balls and one red.129 In each period, the contents of the chosen urn were
emptied in a container. A randomly selected subject was asked to make one (and only
one) private draw of a ball. After that draw, the subject recorded, on an answer sheet, the
color of the draw and his own decision about the urn. The subject’s draw is not
announced to the group, but the subject’s decision about the urn is disclosed. Then the
urn is passed to the next subject for his own private draw, which is not disclosed, and his
own decision about the urn, which is disclosed. This process continued until all subjects
had made decisions, and at that time the experimenter announced the actual urn used.
Subjects could earn $2 for a correct decision.
In this experiment, cascades often developed. After a number of individual
judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions that were inconsistent
with their private draw, but that fit with the majority of previous announcements.130 Over
77% of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15% of private announcements did not reveal
a “private signal,” that is, the information provided by people’s own draw. Consider cases
in which one person’s draw (say, red) contradicted the announcement of his predecessor
(say, Urn B). In such cases, the second announcement nonetheless matched the first about
11% of the time—far less than a majority, but enough to ensure occasional cascades. And
when one person’s draw contradicted the announcement of two or more predecessors, the
second announcement was likely to follow those who went before. Notably, the majority
of decisions followed Bayes’ rule, and hence were rationally based on available
information131—but erroneous cascades were nonetheless found. Here is an actual
example of a cascade producing an entertainingly inaccurate outcome (the urn used was
B)132:
Private draw
Decision

1
a
A

2
a
A

3
b
A

4
b
A

5
b
A

6
b
A

What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private
information—four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, in favor of Urn
B. But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect judgments, led
all others to fall in line. “[I]nitial misrepresentative signals start a chain of incorrect
decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received later.”133 It should be
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simple to see how this result might map onto real-world assessments of factual, moral,
and legal issues, especially in insulated groups, where external correction is less likely.
B. How To Make and Break Cascades
Is the likelihood of cascades affected by institutional arrangements and social
norms? Can legal arrangements diminish or increase the risk of erroneous cascades,
inadvertently or through conscious decision134? A central point here is that in an
informational cascade, everyone is equal; people are simply trying to get the right
answer; and people pay attention to the views and acts of others only because they want
to be right. But it is easy to imagine slight alterations of the situation, so that some
participants know more than others, or so that people do not only care whether they are
right. How would these alterations affect outcomes?
1. Fashion leaders and informed cascade-breakers. In the real world of cascades,
“fashion leaders” have unusual importance.135 A prominent scientist might declare that
global warming is a serious problem; a well-respected political leader might urge that war
should be made against Iraq; a lawyer with particular credibility might conclude that
recent antiterrorist legislation violates the Constitution. In any of these cases, the speaker
provides an especially loud informational signal, perhaps sufficient to start or to stop a
cascade.
Now turn to the actions of followers. In the hormone therapy case, no doctor is
assumed to have, or to believe that she has, more information than her predecessors. But
in many cases, people know, or think that they know, a great deal. It is obvious that such
people are far less likely to follow those who came before. Whether they will do so
should depend on a comparison between the amount of information provided by the
behavior of predecessors and the amount of private information that they have. And in
principle, more informed people will shatter cascades, possibly initiating new and better
ones. Whether this will happen, in practice, depends on whether the people who come
later know, or believe, that the deviant agent was actually well-informed. If so, the more
informed people operate as fashion leaders.
A simple study attempts to test the question whether more informed people
actually shatter cascades.136 The study was essentially the same as the urn experiment just
described, except that players had a special option after any sequence of two identical
decisions (for example, two “Urn A” decisions): They could make not one but two
independent draws before deciding. The other subjects were informed of every case in
which a player was making two draws. The simplest finding is that this “shattering
mechanism” did indeed reduce the number of cascades—and thus significantly improved
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decisions.137 But the mechanism did not work perfectly. In some cases, cascades were
nonetheless found. And in some cases, people who were permitted to draw twice, and
saw two different balls (say, one red and one white), concluded, irrationally, that the
cascade should be broken. The remarkable and somewhat disturbing outcome is that they
initiated an inaccurate cascade. Consider this evidence, in a case in which the actual urn
was A:
Private draw
decision

1
a
A

2
a
A

3
b, a
B

4
b
B

5
a
B

6
b
B

This disturbing pattern undoubtedly has real-world analogues, in which people
sometimes give excessive weight to their own information, even if that information is
ambiguous and in which it makes sense to follow the crowd. But the larger point is the
simple one: More informed people are less influenced by the signals of others, and they
also carry more influence themselves.
But what about cases in which fashion leaders are not necessarily more informed,
or in which they are seen by others as having more information, or more wisdom, than
they actually have? We can imagine self-styled experts—on diets, or herbal foods, or
alternative medicine, or economic trends—who successfully initiate cascades. The risk
here is that the views of fashion leaders will be wrongly taken as authoritative. The result
can be to lead people to errors and even to illness and death. How can society protect
itself? He answers lie in good institutional arrangements, civil liberties, free markets, and
good social norms, encouraging people to be skeptical of supposed experts. In systems
with freedom of speech and free markets, it is always possible to debunk supposedly
authoritative sources. And within groups, it is possible to structure decisionmaking so as
to reduce the relevant risks. Votes might, for example, be taken in reverse order of
seniority, so as to ensure that less experienced people will not be unduly influenced by
the judgments of their predecessors; this is in fact the practice on the United States
Supreme Court.
2. Majority rule: rewarding correct outcomes by groups rather than by individuals.
How would the development of cascades be affected by an institution that rewards
correct answers not by individuals, but by the majority of the group? In an intriguing
variation on the urn experiment, subjects were paid $2 for a correct group decision, and
penalized $2 for an incorrect group decision, with the group decision determined by
majority rule.138 People were neither rewarded nor punished for a correct individual
decision. The result was that only 39% of rounds saw cascades. In 92% of cases, people’s
announcement matched their private draw.139 And because people revealed their private
signals, the system of majority rule produced a substantial increase in fully informed
decisions—that is, the outcomes that someone would reach if he were somehow able to
see all private information in the system. A simple way to understand this point is to
137
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assume that a group has a large number of members and that each member makes an
announcement that matches his private draw. As a statistical matter, it is overwhelmingly
likely that the majority’s position will be correct. As an example, consider this period
from the majority rule experiment140 (the actual urn was A):
Private draw
Decision

a
A

a
A

a
A

a
A

b
B

a
A

a
A

a
A

b
B

What is the explanation for this significantly reduced level of cascade behavior in
a system of majority rule? The answer lies in the fact that the individual knows that he
has nothing to gain from a correct individual decision and everything to gain from a
correct group decision. As a result, it is in the individual’s interest to say exactly what he
sees, because it is the accurate announcement, from each person, that is most likely to
promote an accurate group decision.141
Note that to explain the effect of majority rule in producing better outcomes, it is
not necessary or even helpful to say that when the group decision counts, people are
altruistic or less concerned with their self-interest. On the contrary, self-interest provides
a fully adequate explanation of the people’s behavior. In the individual condition, it is
sensible to care little about the accuracy of one’s signal to others; that is an informational
externality142—affecting others, for better or for worse, but not affecting one’s own
likelihood of gain. If a subject’s individual signal misleads others, the subject has no
reason to care. But under the majority rule condition that I have just described, the
subject should care a great deal about producing an accurate signal, simply because an
inaccurate signal will reduce the likelihood that the group will get it right. And here the
subject need not care about the accuracy of his individual decision except insofar as that
decision provides a helpful signal to the group. Hence it is only to be expected that
cascades are reduced, and correct outcomes are increased, when people are rewarded for
good group decisions.
There is a general point here. It is individually rational, under plausible
assumptions, to participate in a cascade; participants benefit themselves at the same time
that they fail to benefit others (by failing to disclose privately held information) or
affirmatively harm others (by giving them the wrong signal). This claim holds even if
conformity is not rewarded as such. By contrast, it is not rational, under plausible
assumptions, to disclose or act upon private information, even though the disclosure or
action will actually benefit others. The upshot is that dissenters, disclosing their own
private information, need to be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits on those
who observe them. If the point is put together with an emphasis on the risk of cascades on
courts, there is fresh reason to appreciate judicial dissents, if only because they increase
the likelihood that majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note here that within
140
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the Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become the law, indeed
have become the law on well over 130 occasions143—a point to which I will return.
The upshot is that dissenters and nonconformists, disclosing their own private
information, should be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits on those who
observe them. Now let us put this point together with a recognition of the risk of cascades
on courts. We can readily see a new reason to appreciate judicial dissents, if only because
they increase the likelihood that majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note
here that within the Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become
the law, indeed have become the law on well over 130 occasions144—a point to which I
will return.
This claim has an implication for appropriate institutional arrangements: Any
system that creates incentives for individuals to reveal information to the group is likely
to produce better outcomes. A system of majority rule, in which individuals known that
their well-being will be promoted (or not) depending on the group’s decision, therefore
has significant advantages. Well-functioning organizations, public as well as private, are
likely to benefit from this insight. In this light, we might even offer a suggestion about
the nature of civic responsibility: In case of doubt, citizens should reveal their private
signal, rather than disguising that signal and agreeing with the crowd. Perhaps
counterintuitively, this kind of behavior is not optimal from the point of view of the
individual who seeks to get things right, but it is best from the point of view of a group or
nation that seeks to use all relevant information.
3. Disclosers, dissenters, and contrarians. It is important to make some
distinctions here. The majority-rewarding variation on the urn experiment gives people an
incentive to disclose accurate, privately-held information. This is the information from
which the group benefits, and this is the information that does not emerge if people are
rewarded for correct individual decisions. Full disclosure of accurate information is a
central goal of institutional design.145 But the experiment does not suggest that a group is
better off if people always disagree, or even if they always say what they think. In the tale
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of the Emperor’s New Clothes, the boy is not a skeptic or a malcontent. On the contrary,
he is a particular kind of dissenter; he is a discloser, revealing the information that he
actually holds. The majority-rewarding variation of the urn experiment encourages
subjects to act like that boy.
By contrast, we can imagine a different kind of person, a contrarian, who feels
that he will be rewarded, financially or otherwise, simply for disagreeing with others.
There is no reason to celebrate the contrarian. In many cases, contrarians are most
unlikely to give any help to the group. If the contrarian is known as such, his signal will
be very noisy and not very informative. If the contrarian is not known as such, he is still
failing to disclose accurate information, and in that sense he is not helping the group to
arrive at correct decisions. We could imagine a variation on the urn experiment in which
a contrarian-confederate regularly announced the opposite of what his predecessor
announced. It is safe to predict that such behavior would reduce cascades, but it would
not reduce errors by individuals or groups. On the contrary, it would increase them.
Dissenters who are disclosers, then, are to be prized. This is certainly if they are
disclosing the full truth about the issue at hand, and also if they are revealing accurate
information, bearing on that issue, that they actually hold. By contrast, dissenters who are
contrarians are at best a mixed blessing. And we can also imagine dissenters who do not
disclose a missing fact, but instead simply state a point of view that would otherwise be
missing from group discussion. Such dissenters might urge, for example, that animals
should have rights, or that school prayer should be permitted, or that the law should allow
homosexual marriage, or that capital punishment should be banned. In the domains of
politics and law, cascade-type behavior typically leads people to be silent not about facts,
but about points of view. It is obvious that a group needs relevant facts; does it need to
know about privately held opinions as well?
There are two reasons that it does. First, those opinions are of independent
interest. If most or many people favor school prayer, or believe that capital punishment is
morally unacceptable, it is valuable to know that fact. Other things being equal, both
individuals and governments do better if they know what their fellow citizens really
think. Second, people with dissenting opinions might well have good arguments. It is
important for those who conform, or fall into a cascade, or independently concur to hear
those arguments. This is a standard Millian point,146 to which I will shortly return. Judge
Richard Posner suggests that judges often offer a “go along concurrence,”147 joining the
majority though they privately disagree. Such judges give a false signal about their actual
opinions and, very possibly, their future votes.
4. Conformity and reputation. Suppose that people are rewarded not only or not
mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing what other people do. The reward
might be material, in the form of more cash or improved prospects, or it might be nonmaterial, in the form of more and better relationships. In the real world, people are often
punished for nonconformity and rewarded for conformity. Someone who rejects the
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views of leaders or of the majority, might well find himself less likely to be promoted and
more likely to be disliked. Organizations, groups, and governments often prize harmony,
and nonconformists tend to introduce disharmony. Sometimes it is more important to be
“on the team” than to be right. “Sometimes cultural groups adopt very high levels of
norm enforcement that severely suppress the individual variations, innovations, and
‘errors’ that innate cultural transmission mechanisms require to generate adaptive
evolutionary processes within groups.”148
The likely result should be clear. If rewards come to those who conform, cascadelike behavior will increase, simply because the incentive to be correct is strengthened or
replaced by the incentive to do what others do. The extent of this effect will depend on
the extent of the incentive to conform. But whenever the incentive is positive, people will
be all the more likely to ignore their private information and to follow others. The
opposite result should be expected if people are penalized for following others or
rewarded for independence; if so, cascade-like behavior should be reduced or even
eliminated. I am now emphasizing the incentive to conform, but in some settings
independence is prized, and I will offer a few remarks on that possibility below.
If conformity is rewarded, the problem is especially severe for the earliest
disclosers or dissenters, who “may bear especially high costs because they are
conspicuous, individually identified, and easy to isolate for reprisals.”149 And if the
earliest dissenters are successfully deterred, dissent is likely to be exceedingly rare. But
once the number of disclosers or dissenters reaches a certain level, there may be a tipping
point, producing a massive change in behavior.150 Indeed a single discloser, or a single
skeptic, might be able to initiate a chain of events by which a myth is shattered. Return to
the tale of the Emperor’s New Clothes: “A child, however, who had no important job and
could only see things as his eyes showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The
Emperor is naked,’ he said. . . . [T]he boy's remark, which had been heard by the
bystanders, was repeated over and over again until everyone cried: ‘The boy is right! The
Emperor is naked! It's true!’”151 But it might be very difficult to initiate this process,
especially if early disclosers are subject to social or legal sanctions. Here we can see a
potentially beneficial role of misfits and malcontents, who should perform a valuable
function in getting otherwise neglected material and perspectives to others. Consider the
suggestion that extremely harmful cultural effects result from a “social structure” that
eliminates “valuable innovators, experimenters, and error-makers from being viewed as
people to copy.”152 The qualification, noted above, is that regular contrarians might
reduce cascades without reducing errors.153
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a. An experiment. With respect to conformity, these speculations are supported by
an ingenious variation on the urn experiment mentioned above.154 In this experiment,
people were paid twenty-five cents for a correct decision, but seventy-five cents for a
decision that matched the decision of the majority of the group. There were punishments
for incorrect and nonconforming answers as well. If people made an incorrect decision,
they lost twenty-five cents; if their decision failed to match the group’s decision, they lost
seventy-five cents.
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer than 96.7%
of rounds resulted in cascades,155 and 35.3% of announcements did not match the
announcer’s private signal, that is, the signal given by his own draw.156 And when the
draw of a subsequent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor, 72.2% of
people matched the first announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, this period
of the experiment157 (the actual urn for this period was B):
Conformity Experiment
Private draw
Decision

1
a
A

2
b
A

3
b
A

4
b
A

5
a
A

6
b
A

7
b
A

8
b
A

9
a
A

10
b
A

b. Affective ties and stifled dissent. The lesson is that institutions that reward
conformity, and punish deviance, are far more likely to produce worse decisions and to
reveal less in the way of private information. And here there is a link to the earlier
suggestion that serious mistakes are committed by groups whose members are connected
by bonds of affection, friendship, and solidarity.158 In such groups, members are usually
less willing, or even unwilling, to state objections and counterarguments, for fear that
these will violate generally held norms. Cascades and bad decisions are likely; return to
the investment clubs discussed above.159 We can see here that an organization that
depends on affective ties is likely to stifle dissent and to minimize the disclosure of
private information and belief; some religious and political organizations are obvious
illustrations. A socially destructive norm of conformity aggravates people’s tendency to
ignore their private information and to say and do what others do.
If an organization wants to avoid error, it should make clear that it welcomes the
disclosure private signals, simply because that is in the organization’s own general
interest. This point might seem counterintuitive, because in most well-functioning
societies, conformity to the majority’s view seems to be the civil thing to do. What I am
suggesting here is that from the social standpoint, it is better to behave in the way that
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one would if being right were all that mattered, and better still to behave as one would if
a correct group decision were all that mattered.
Of course the normative issues are not simple. Bonds of affection and solidarity
are often important to group members, and many people do not appreciate dissent and
disagreement. Perhaps the real point of the relevant group or organization is not to
perform well, but to foster good relationships. Conformists avoid creating the difficulties
that come from contestation, but at the expense, often, of a good outcome; dissenters tend
to increase contestation while also improving performance.160 In the abstract, it is hard to
specify the optimal tradeoffs between the various goods. If the central goal of group
members is to maintain and improve social bonds and not to carry out some task,
conformity might be encouraged, at least if nonconformists introduce tension and
hostility. Or consider the question of dissent in wartime. It is important for those who
wage war to know what citizens really think and also to have a sense of actual and
potential errors. But it is also important, especially in wartime, for citizens to have a
degree of solidarity and to believe that they are involved in a common endeavor; this
belief can help solve collective action problems that otherwise threaten success. Some
forms of dissent might correct mistakes while also undermining social bonds. Of course
freedom of speech should be the rule, but there is no simple solution to this dilemma. We
might simply notice that those who are inclined to dissent must decide whether it is
worthwhile to create the disruption that comes from expressing their views.161
c. When silence is golden. I have been stressing cases in which disclosure is in the
group’s interest, but the immediately preceding discussion suggests the opposite
possibility.162 If group members reveal information that is embarrassing or worse, they
might assist a competitor or an adversary. They might also make it harder for the group to
have candid discussions in the future, simply because everyone knows that whatever is
said might be made public. Strong norms against “leaking” are a natural corrective. And
if some members of the group have engaged in wrongdoing, revelation of that fact might
injure many or all group members. Anyone who has ever attended a faculty meeting is
aware of the possibility that speakers receive the full benefits of the time they use, while
inflicting costs on others; this unfortunate state of affairs can lead to unduly long
meetings. The same problem can inflict the deliberations of both legislatures and courts.
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Conformity to a group norm, involving silence or informal time constraints, can be
extremely valuable.
It is important to acknowledge that the problem I am emphasizing—the failure to
disclose accurate information that will benefit the public—is closely paralleled by the
problems raised in many cases in which silence, not revelation, is a collective good.163
And if disclosure will spread inaccurate information, it is unlikely to be beneficial,164
especially if it negates the beneficial effects of previous decisions or produces a cascade
of its own. Because my focus is on the failure to disclose information, I will not devote
attention to situations in which silence is golden, except to note that the basic analysis of
those situations is not so different from the analysis here.165
d. Variations and the real world. The conformity experiment could itself be varied
in many ways, with predictable results. If financial rewards were solely or almost solely
for conformity, cascade behavior would be increased; if the seventy-five cent reward
were cut in half, cascade behavior should decline. Of course it is possible to imagine
many mixed systems. An obvious example is a system of majority rule in which people
are also rewarded for conformity or punished for nonconformity. Will cascades develop
in such cases? The answer will depend on the size of the various incentives. If the
accuracy of the group’s decision will greatly affect individual well-being—if their lives
depend on good results—cascades are less likely. But if the ultimate outcome has little
effect, and if conformity will carry high rewards, cascades are inevitable. A system in
which individuals receive $2 for a correct majority decision, and $.25 for conforming,
will produce different (and better) results from a system in which individuals receive $.25
for a correct majority decision, and $2 for conformity.
The real world of groups and democracy offers countless variations on these
rewards, and often the rewards are highly indeterminate; people do not know what they
are or have a hard time in quantifying them. But there can be little doubt that conformity
pressures actually result in less disclosure of information. Consider the suggestion of a
medical researcher who questions a number of Lyme disease diagnoses: “Doctors can’t
say what they think anymore. . . . If you quote me as saying these things, I’m as good as
dead.”166 When privately interviewed, gang members express considerable discomfort
about their antisocial behavior, but their own conduct suggests a full commitment,
leading to a widespread belief that most people approve of what is being done.167 Or
consider the remarks of a sociologist who has publicly raised questions about the health
threats posed by mad-cow disease, suggesting that if you raise those doubts publicly,
“You get made to feel like a pedophile.”168 Tocqueville explained the decline of the
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French church, in the mid-eighteenth century, in these terms: “Those who retained their
beliefs in the doctrines of the Church . . . dreading isolation more than error, professed to
share the sentiments of the majority. So what was in reality the opinion of only a part . . .
of the nation came to be regarded as the will of all and for this reason seemed irresistible,
even to those who had given it this false appearance.”169 Or consider, as a chilling
example, the suggestion from a killer of Mostar, during the Bosniar war, that his actions
were not a product of his convictions about the evil character of those he was killing. On
the contrary, many of them were his former friends. His explanation was that he had to do
what he did to remain a part of his Serbian community.170
There is a final wrinkle. In the settings discussed thus far, dissenters proceed at
their peril and nonconformity is punished. This will be my emphasis throughout. But in
some contexts, dissenters might be attempting to improve their own prospects, and
dissenting might be a sensible way of doing that. A political dissenter, challenging some
widespread practice, sometimes becomes more prominent and more successful as a
result. A judge who dissents in a high-profile case might not greatly fear that her
reputation will be harmed; on the contrary, she might think that the dissent will redound
to her benefit. The point is strengthened once we consider the fact that a society consists
of countless communities with a wide range of values and beliefs. A public dissenter
might impair his reputation in one group but simultaneously strengthen it in another. Of
course, some people say and do exactly what they think and do not greatly care about
their reputations; for them, informational influences are far more important. The only
suggestions are that much of the time, people do not want to lose the good opinion of
relevant others, and that the result of this desire is to reduce the information that the
public is able to have.
e. Beyond information. Often people lack much information, strictly speaking, but
they do have preferences and values. They might believe that the words “under God”
should not be included in the pledge of allegiance. They might want to discontinue
affirmative action. But in either case they might not reveal what they want, simply
because of the pressure to conform. I have suggested that from the standpoint of
democratic practice, this is a problem as well. Most of the time, it is valuable for people
to disclose what they want and what they value. The basic findings as in the urn
experiments would undoubtedly be the same for preferences and values as well as facts,
with rewards for conformity greatly increasing the apparent (not real) degree of
agreement.
This point helps explain why “[u]npopular or dysfunctional norms may survive
even in the presence of a huge, silent majority of dissenters.”171 Fearing the wrath of
others, people might not publicly contest practices and values that they privately abhor.
The practice of sexual harassment long predated the idea of sexual harassment, and the
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innumerable women who were subject to harassment did not like it.172 But much of the
time they were silent, largely because they feared the consequences of public complaint.
It is interesting to speculate about the possibility that many current practices fall in the
same general category: those that produce harm, and are known to produce harm, but that
persist because most of those who are harmed believe that they will suffer if they object
in public.
C. Reputational Cascades
If conformity pressures are taken seriously, we can see the possibility of
reputational cascades, parallel to their informational sibling.173 In a reputational cascade,
people think that they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they
nonetheless go along with the crowd. Even the most confident people sometimes fall prey
to this process, silencing themselves in the process. In fact the conformity-rewarding
version of the urn experiment is an elegant example of a reputational cascade. It is thus
possible to exploit the influence of peer pressure, found in the conformity experiments, to
show how many social movements become possible.
1. Mechanics. Suppose that Albert suggests that global warming is a serious
problem, and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually agrees with
Albert, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be ignorant or indifferent to
human suffering and environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara agree that global
warming is a serious problem, Cynthia might not contradict them publicly, and might
even seem to share their judgment, not because she believes the judgment to be correct,
but because she does not want to face the hostility or lose the good opinion of others. It is
easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia
offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most reluctant to contradict
them even if he thinks that they are wrong. In the actual world of group decisions, people
are of course uncertain whether publicly expressed statements are a product of
independent knowledge, participation in an informational cascade, or reputational
pressure. It is reasonable to think that much of the time, listeners and observers overstate
the extent to which the actions of others are based on independent information.
Reputational cascades occur within all branches of government. Of course
legislators are vulnerable to reputational pressures; that is part of their job. When elected
representatives suddenly support legislation to deal with an apparent (sometimes not real)
crisis, they are involved in a reputational cascade.174 Consider, for example, the rush, in
July 2002, to enact measures to deal with corporate corruption.175 Undoubtedly many
legislators had private qualms about the very legislation that they supported, and some of
them probably disapproved of measures for which they nonetheless voted. So too with
the unanimous (!) disapproval, by members of the United States Senate, of the court of
appeals decision to strike down the use of the words “under God” in the pledge of
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allegiance. 176 In both cases, some legislators were involved in a reputational cascade,
repressing their private doubts in order to avoid injury to their reputations.
2. Pluralistic ignorance and self-censorship. I have emphasized that in an
informational cascade, the most serious problem is that the group fails to receive
privately held information. Exactly the same problem arises in a reputational cascade,
where the public, for a very different reason, is unable to learn what many people know
and think. Here people silence themselves not because they believe that they are wrong
but because they do not want to face the disapproval that, they think, would follow from
expressing the view that they believe to be correct. The underlying problem here is
pluralistic ignorance: ignorance, on the part of most or all, of what most people actually
think.177 In the face of pluralistic ignorance, people can assume, wrongly, that others have
a certain view, and they alter their statements and actions accordingly.
Under certain conditions, this self-censorship is an extremely serious social loss.
For example, Communism was able to sustain itself in Eastern Europe, not only because
of force, but because people believed, wrongly, that most people supported the existing
regime.178 The fall of Communism was made possible only by the disclosure of privately
held views, which turned pluralistic ignorance into something closer to pluralistic
knowledge.179 As we shall see, self-censoring can undermine success during war.180
Reputational pressures also help fuel ethnic identifications, sometimes producing high
levels of hostility among groups for which, merely a generation before, such
identifications were unimportant and hostility was barely imaginable.181 And if certain
views are punished, it is possible that unpopular views will eventually be lost to public
debate, so that what was once “unthinkable” is now “unthought.”182 Views that were
originally taboo, and offered rarely or not at all, become excised entirely, simply because
they have not been heard. Here too those who do not care about their reputation, and who
say what they really think, perform a valuable public service, often at their own
expense.183
Various civil liberties, including freedom of speech, can be seen as an effort to
insulate people from the pressure to conform, and the reason is not only to protect private
rights, but also to protect the public against the risk of self-silencing. A striking claim by
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Joseph Raz clarifies the point: “If I were to choose between living in a society which
enjoys freedom of expression, but not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a
society which does not have it, I would have no hesitation in judging that my own
personal interest is better served by the first option.”184 The claim makes sense in light of
the fact that a system of free speech confers countless benefits on people who do not
much care about exercising that right. Consider the fact that in the history of the world,
no society with democratic elections and free speech has ever experienced a famine185—a
demonstration of the extent in which political liberty protects people who do not exercise
it. Freedom of association is especially noteworthy here, because it allows people to band
together in groups in which the ordinary incentive to conform might be absent or even
reversed. Society in general might punish certain political views, but associations can be
found in which those views are tolerated or even encouraged. The secret ballot can be
seen in related terms.186 One advantage of the secret ballot is that it reduces informational
pressures, leading the voter to express his own preference and to be less influenced by the
views of others. (Recall the majority-rewarding version of the urn experiment.) But the
more obvious advantage is that the voter can act anonymously and thus cast his ballot
without fear of opprobrium.
Just as informational cascades may be limited in their reach, there can be local
reputational cascades—ones that reshape the public pronouncements of particular
subgroups without affecting those of the broader society. When certain subgroups believe
that nonexistent risks are actually quite serious, or that some hopeless medical treatment
produces miracle cures, reputational cascades might well be involved, simply because
skeptics do not speak out. Of course informational influences interact with reputational
ones. South Africa, for example, has experienced the literally deadly phenomenon of
“AIDS denial,” with prominent leaders suggesting that AIDS is not a real disease, but
instead a conspiracy to sell certain drugs to poor people. In that case, a cascade did
develop, but it was based mostly on transmission of alleged facts, not on fear of
reputational harm.187 But if we emphasize reputational pressures, we can identity an
important reason for unusual beliefs—about facts and values—among various
communities of like-minded people. It is often tempting to attribute such differences to
deep historical or cultural factors, but the real source, much of the time, is reputational
pressure.
Of course political leaders often play an important role in building those
pressures.188 If leaders insist that something is true, or that the nation should pursue a
certain course of action, some citizens might well be reluctant to dissent, if only because
of a fear of public disapproval. Here as elsewhere, the result can be a serious social loss.
And here again a strong system of civil liberties, and an insistence on making safe space
for enclaves of dissenters, can be justified not as an effort to protect individual rights, but
as a safeguard against social blunders. A market system aggregates and spreads
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information better than any planner could possibly do.189 In the same way, a system of
free expression and dissent protects against the false confidence and the inevitable
mistakes of planners, both private and public.
It would make little sense to say that cascades, in general, are good or bad.
Sometimes cascade effects will overcome group or public torpor, by generating concern
about serious though previously ignored problems. Sometimes cascade effects will make
people far more worried than they would otherwise be and produce large-scale distortions
in private judgments, public policy, and law. It is reasonable to speculate that the
antislavery movement had distinctive cascade-like features, as did the environmental
movement in the United States, the fall of Communism,190 and the anti-apartheid
movement in South Africa; so too with Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the rise of Nazism
in Germany. Typically cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people’s
commitments are based on little private information. What I have emphasized here is the
serious risk that social cascades can lead to widespread errors, factual or otherwise.
D. Boundedly Rational Cascades
Thus far the discussion has assumed that people are largely rational—that they
take account, rationally, of the information provided by the statements and actions of
others, and that they care, sensibly enough, about their reputation. The principal
exception, suggested above, is that people may mistake a cascade for a large number of
independent decisions. But it is well-known that human beings are “boundedly rational.”
In most domains, people use heuristics, or mental short-cuts, and they also show
identifiable biases.191 Indeed, following others can itself be seen as a heuristic, one that
usually works well, but that also misfires in some cases.192 And for other heuristics and
for every bias, there is a corresponding possibility of a cascade.
Consider, for example, the availability heuristic, which has probably become the
most well-known in law.193 When people use the availability heuristic, they answer a
hard question about probability by asking whether examples come readily to mind.194
How likely is a flood, an earthquake, an airplane crash, a traffic jam, a terrorist attack, or
a disaster at a nuclear power plant? Lacking statistical knowledge, people try to think of
illustrations.195 For people without statistical knowledge—which is to say most people—
it is hardly irrational to use the availability heuristic. The problem is that this heuristic
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can lead to serious errors of fact, in the form of excessive fear of small risks and neglect
of large ones.196 And indeed both surveys and actual behavior show extensive use of the
availability heuristic. Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly
affected by recent experiences.197 If floods have not occurred in the immediate past,
people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.198 In the
aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines
steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.199
For present purposes, the key point is that the availability heuristic does not
operate in a social vacuum. Whether an incident is “available” is a function of social
interactions. These interactions rapidly spread salient illustrations within relevant
communities, making those illustrations available to many or most. Should swimmers
worry about shark attacks?200 Are young girls likely to be abducted?201 In both cases, the
United States has recently seen “availability cascades,”202 in which salient examples were
rapidly spread from one person to the next. Note that this process typically involves
information. If some people use a recent assault to show that there is a serious risk of
crime ten blocks north, or a recent airplane accident to show that it is unsafe to fly, their
statements carry a certain authority, leading others to believe that they are true. And in
the case of shark attacks and abduction of young girls, the media spread a few gripping
examples, apparently providing information that was rapidly transmitted to millions of
people. But reputational forces play a role as well. Much of the time, people are reluctant
to say that an example is misleading and hence that others’ fears are groundless. Efforts
at correction may suggest stupidity or callousness, and a desire to avoid public
opprobrium may produce a form of silencing.
Availability cascades are ubiquitous. Vivid examples, alongside social
interactions, help account for decisions to purchase insurance against natural disasters.203
Cascade effects explain the existence of widespread public concern about abandoned
hazardous waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental hazard).204 In more recent
years, availability cascades spurred public fears not only of shark attacks and abductions
196

See Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J.
Legal Stud 747 (1991); Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
Stan L Rev 683, 703-05 (1999).
197
For a vivid demonstration in the context of catastrophes, see Jacob Gersen, Strategy and Cognition:
Regulatory Catastrophic Risk (unpublished manuscript 2001). See also Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk
40 (2000).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
See the discussion of the shark attack cascade in Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and
the Environment (2002).
201
See Howard Kurtz, The 'Crime Wave' Against Girls, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A35380-2002Aug2.html: “Could the saturation coverage be painting a distorted picture, like
the great shark scare last summer?. . . [T]ake these much-hyped abductions, add in the half dozen other
cases mentioned by the national media since the first of the year . . . [it] still doesn't qualify as a new crime
wave.”
202
See Kuran and Sunstein, supra note.
203
See Jacob Gersen, Strategy and Cognition: Regulating Catastrophic Risk (unpublished manuscript
2001).
204
See Kuran and Sunstein, supra note.

40

of girls, but also of the pesticide Alar, of plane crashes, and of shootings in schools in the
aftermath of the murders in Littleton, Colorado.205 Such effects helped produce massive
dislocations in beef production in Europe in connection with “mad cow disease”206; they
help also to account for the outpouring of enthusiasm for regulation of accounting
practices in the aftermath of the 2001 scandal involving Enron and other corporations.207
My suggestion is not that in all or most of these cases, availability cascades led to
excessive or inappropriate reactions. On the contrary, such cascades sometimes have the
valuable effect of promoting public attention to serious but neglected problems. The
suggestion is only that the intensity of public reactions is best understood by seeing the
interaction between the availability heuristic and the cascade effects I have been
emphasizing.208 The problem is that those interactions make some errors inevitable,
simply because a heuristic, even if generally helpful, is bound to misfire in many cases.
Here as elsewhere, dissent can be an important corrective. For organizations and
governments, the question is how to make dissent less costly, or even to reward it,
especially when dissenters benefit not themselves, but others.
IV. Group Polarization
Thus far I have been exploring how informational and reputational influences
produce conformity and cascades. I have also identified factors that can increase or
reduce the likelihood of both of these. When people are not bound by affective ties, the
magnitude of both influences diminishes. When people define themselves as opposed to
the relevant others, the direction of the influence might even shift. Greater information of
course reduces the effects, and when people know that certain people are more informed,
cascades are shattered. With these points in view, let us now turn to the phenomenon of
group polarization, a phenomenon that contains large lessons about the behavior of
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interest groups, religious organizations, political parties, juries, legislatures, judicial
panels, and even nations.209
A. The Basic Phenomenon
What happens within deliberating bodies? Do groups compromise? Do they move
toward the middle of the tendencies of their individual members? The answer is now
clear, and it is perhaps not what intuition would suggest: Members of a deliberating
group end up in a more extreme position in line with their tendencies before deliberation
began.210 This is the phenomenon known as group polarization. Group polarization is the
typical pattern with deliberating groups, having been found in hundreds of studies
involving over a dozen countries, including the United States, France, and Germany.211
It follows that a group of people who think that global warming is a serious
problem will, after discussion, think that global warming is a very serious problem; that
those who approve of an ongoing war effort will, as a result of discussion, become still
more enthusiastic about that effort; that people who dislike the Rehnquist Court will
dislike it quite intensely after talking with one another; that people who disapprove of the
United States, and are suspicious of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and
suspicion if they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter
phenomenon among citizens of France.212 When like-minded people talk with one
another, they usually end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before
they started to talk. It should be readily apparent that enclaves of people, inclined to
rebellion or even violence, might move sharply in that direction as a consequence of
internal deliberations. Political extremism is often a product of group polarization.213
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There is a close relationship between group polarization and cascade effects. Both
of these are a product of informational and reputational influences. A key difference is
that group polarization refers to the effects of deliberation,214 and cascades typically do
not involve discussion at all. In addition, group polarization does not necessarily involve
a cascade-like process. Polarization can result simply from simultaneous independent
decisions, by all or most individuals, to move toward a more extreme point in line with
the tendencies of group members.
To see the operation of group polarization in a legal context, let us explore in
more detail the study of punitive intentions and punitive damage awards, referred to
above.215 The study involved about 3000 jury-eligible citizens; its major purpose was to
determine how individuals would be influenced by seeing and discussing the punitive
intentions of others. Hence subjects were asked to record, in advance of deliberation, a
“punishment judgment” on a scale of 0 to 8, where 0 indicated that the defendant should
not be punished at all, and 8 indicated that the defendant should be punished extremely
severely. After the individual judgments were recorded, jurors were sorted into sixperson groups and asked to deliberate to a unanimous “punishment verdict.” It would be
reasonable to predict that the verdicts of juries would be the median of punishment
judgments of jurors; but the prediction would be badly wrong.
Instead the effect of deliberation was to create both a severity shift for highpunishment jurors and a leniency shift for low-punishment jurors.216 When the median
judgment of individual jurors was four or more on the eight-point scale, the jury’s verdict
was above that median judgment.217 Consider, for example, a case involving a man who
nearly drowned on a defectively constructed yacht. Jurors tended to be outraged by the
idea of a defectively built yacht, and groups were significantly more outraged than their
median members.218 But when the median judgment of individual jurors was below four,
the jury’s verdict was typically below that median judgment.219 Consider a case involving
a shopper who was injured in a fall when an escalator suddenly stopped.220 Individual
jurors were not greatly bothered by the incident, seeing it as a genuine accident rather
than a case of serious wrongdoing; and jurors were more lenient than individual jurors.221
Here, then, is a clear example of group polarization in action. Groups whose members
were antecedently inclined to impose large punishments become inclined toward larger
punishments. The opposite effect was found with groups whose members were inclined
toward small punishments.
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B. Outrage
When we consider the ingredients of punishment judgments, this finding has a
large implication for people’s behavior both inside and outside the courtroom.
Punishment judgments are rooted in outrage,222 and a group’s outrage, on a bounded
scale, is an excellent predictor of the same group’s punishment judgments, on the same
scale.223 Apparently people who begin with a high level of outrage become still more
outraged as a result of group discussion. Moreover, the degree of the shift depends on the
antecedent level of outrage; the higher the original level, the greater the shift as a result of
internal deliberations.224 There is a point here about the well-springs of not only of severe
punishment by jurors, mobs, and governments, but also of rebellion and violence.225 If
like-minded people, predisposed to be outraged, are put together with one another,
significant changes are to be expected.
It should be easy to see that group polarization is inevitably at work in feuds,
ethnic and international strife, and war. One of the characteristic features of feuds is that
members of feuding groups tend to talk only to one another, fueling and amplifying their
outrage, and solidifying their impression of the relevant events. Group polarization
occurs every day within Israel and among the Palestinian Authority. Many social
movements, both good and bad, become possible through the heightened effects of
outrage226; consider the movement for rights for deaf people, which was greatly enhanced
by the fact that the deaf have a degree of geographical isolation.227
C. Hidden Profiles and Self-Silencing in Groups
The tendency toward extreme movement is the most noteworthy finding in the
literature on group polarization.228 But there is a neglected point, of special importance
for my argument here: In a deliberating group, those with a minority position often
silence themselves or otherwise have disproportionately little weight. The result can be
“hidden profiles”—important information that is not shared within the group.229 Group
members often have information but do not discuss it, and the result is to produce inferior
decisions.
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Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both face-to-face and
online. The purpose of the study was to see how groups might collaborate to make
personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying for a marketing manager
position, were placed before the groups. The attributes of the candidates were rigged by
the experimenters so that one applicant was clearly the best for the job described. Packets
of information were given to subjects, each containing a subset of information from the
resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant information. The
groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some operating on-line.
Two results were especially striking. First, group polarization was common, as groups
ended up in a more extreme position in accordance with the original thinking of their
members. Second, almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously
the right choice, because they failed to share information in a way that would permit the
group to make an objective decision. Members tended to share positive information about
the winning candidate and negative information about the losers, while also suppressing
negative information about the winner and positive information about the losers. Their
statements served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add
complications and fuel debate.”231
230

This finding is in line with the more general suggestion that groups tend to dwell
on shared information and to neglect information that is held by few members. It should
be unnecessary to emphasize that this tendency can lead to large errors.232 To understand
this particular point, it is necessary to explore the mechanisms that produce group
polarization.
D. Why Polarization? Some Explanations
Why do like-minded people go to extremes? There are several reasons.233
1. Information. The most important, involving informational influences, is similar
to what we have found in connection with conformity and cascades. The simple idea here
is that people respond to the arguments made by other people—and the “argument pool,”
in any group with some initial disposition in one direction, will inevitably be skewed
toward that disposition.234 A group whose members tend to think that Israel is the real
aggressor in the Mideast conflict will tend to hear many arguments to that effect, and
relatively few opposing views. It is inevitable that the group’s members will have heard
some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from the discussion. Having heard all of
what is said, there is likely to be further movement in the anti-Israel direction. So too
with a group whose members tend to oppose affirmative action: Group members will
hear a large number of arguments against affirmative action and a fewer number of
arguments on its behalf. If people are listening, they will have a stronger conviction, in
230
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the same direction from which they began, as a result of deliberation. An emphasis on
limited argument pools also helps to explain the problem of “hidden profiles” and the
greater discussion of shared information during group discussion. It is simply a statistical
fact that when more people have a piece of information, there is a greater probability that
it will be mentioned.235 Hidden profiles are a predictable result, to the detriment of the
ultimate decision.
2. Confidence and corroboration. The second explanation begins by noting that
people with extreme views tend to have more confidence that they are right, and that as
people gain confidence, they become more extreme in their beliefs. 236 The intuition here
is simple: People who lack confidence, and who are unsure what they should think, tend
to moderate their views. It is for this reason that cautious people, not knowing what to do,
are likely to choose the midpoint between relevant extremes.237 But if other people seem
to share your view, you are likely to become more confident that you are correct—and
hence to move in a more extreme direction. In a wide variety of experimental contexts,
people’s opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply because their view
has been corroborated, and because they have been more confident after learning of the
shared views of others.238 Note that there is an obvious connection between this
explanation and the finding, mentioned above, that a panel of three judges of the same
party is likely to behave quite differently from a panel with only two such judges. The
existence of unanimous confirmation, from two others, will strengthen confidence and
hence strengthen extremity.239
3. Social comparison. A third explanation, involving social comparison, begins
with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group members, and
also to perceive themselves favorably.240 Their views may, to a greater or lesser extent,
be a function of how they want to present themselves. Once people hear what others
believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position, to hold onto
their preserved self-presentation. They may want to signal, for example, that they are not
cowardly or cautious, especially in an entrepreneurial group that disparages these
characteristics, and hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear as such
by comparison to other group members.241 And when they hear what other people think,
they might find that they occupy a somewhat different position, in relation to the group,
from what they hoped; and they shift accordingly.242
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For example, if people believe that they are somewhat more opposed to capital
punishment than most people, they might shift a bit after finding themselves in a group of
people who are strongly opposed to capital punishment, to maintain their preferred selfpresentation. The phenomenon appears to occur in many contexts.243 People may wish,
for example, not to seem too enthusiastic, or too restrained in their enthusiasm for,
affirmative action, feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may
shift when they see what other group members think. The result is to press the group’s
position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce shifts in individual members.
There is a great deal of support for this account of group polarization.244
Note that an emphasis on social comparison gives a new and perhaps better
explanation for the existence of hidden profiles and the failure to share certain
information within a group. People might emphasize shared views and information, and
downplay unusual perspectives and new evidence, simply from a fear of group rejection
and a desire for general approval.245 In political and legal institutions, there is an
unfortunate implication: Group members who care about one another’s approval, or who
depend upon one another for material or nonmaterial benefits, might well suppress highly
relevant information. Hence this account of group polarization is connected with the idea
of reputational cascades, where blunders are highly probable.
E. Skewed Debates
In the context of punitive damage awards by juries, a particular finding deserves
emphasis.246 Thus far my discussion of the relevant study has stressed how deliberation
affected punitive intentions, measured on a bounded numerical scale. But jurors were also
asked to record their dollar judgments, in advance of deliberation, and then to deliberate
to dollar verdicts. Did high awards go up and low awards go down, as the idea of group
polarization might predict? Not quite. The principal effect was make all awards go up, in
the sense that the jury’s dollar award typically exceeded the median award of individual
jurors.247 Indeed, the effect was so pronounced that in 27% of cases, the jury’s verdict
was as high as, or higher than, the highest predeliberation judgment of jurors!248 There is
a further point. The effect of deliberation, in increasing dollar awards, was most
pronounced in the case of high awards. For example, the median individual judgment, in
the case involving the defective yacht, was $450,000, whereas the median jury judgment,
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in that same case, was $1,000,000.249 But awards shifted upwards for low awards as
well.250
Why did this happen? A possible explanation, consistent with group polarization,
is that any positive median award suggests a predeliberation tendency to punish, and
deliberation aggravates that tendency by increasing awards. But even if it is right, this
explanation seems insufficiently specific. The striking fact is that those arguing for higher
awards seem to have an automatic rhetorical advantage over those arguing for lower
awards. A subsequent study of law students supports this finding, suggesting that given
existing social norms, people find it easy, in the abstract, to defend higher punitive
awards against corporations, and harder to defend lower awards.251 Findings of rhetorical
advantage have been made in seemingly distant areas. Suppose that doctors are deciding
what steps to take to resuscitate patients. Are individuals less likely to support heroic
efforts than groups? Evidence suggests that as individuals, doctors are less likely to do so
than groups, apparently because those who favor such efforts have a rhetorical advantage
over those who do not.252
Or consider the difference between individual behavior and team behavior in the
Dictator Game, used by social scientists to study selfishness and altruism.253 In this game,
a subject is told that she can allocate a sum of money, say $10, between herself and some
stranger. The standard economic prediction is that most subjects will keep all or almost
all of the money for themselves; why should we share money with strangers? But the
standard prediction is wrong. Most people choose to keep somewhere between $6 and $8
and to share the rest.254 The question here, however, is how is individual behavior is
affected once people are placed in teams. The answer is that team members choose still
more equal divisions.255 This result seems best explained by reference to a rhetorical
advantage, disfavoring selfishness, even within a group that stands to benefit.256
Apparently people do not want to appear to be greedy. Of course this outcome, and the
effect of group influence, would change if the team in the Dictator Game had some
reason to be hostile to the beneficiaries of their generosity. We can easily imagine a
variation of the dictator game in which, for example, people of a relatively poor religious
group were deciding how much to allocate to another religious group that was thought to
be both hostile and far wealthier. In this variation, the rhetorical advantage might favor
greater selfishness.
But what produces a rhetorical advantage? The simplest answer points to
prevailing social norms, which of course vary across time and place. Among most
249
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Americans, current norms make it easier to argue, other things equal, for higher penalties
against corporations for egregious misconduct, But it is possible to imagine
subcommunities (corporate headquarters?) in which the rhetorical advantage runs the
other way. In any case it is easy to envisage many other contexts in which one or another
side has an automatic rhetorical advantage. Consider, as possible examples, debates over
whether there should be higher penalties for those convicted of drug offenses, or whether
tax rates should be reduced; in modern political debates, those favoring higher penalties
and lower taxes have the upper hand. Of course there are limits on the feasible level of
change. But when a rhetorical advantage is involved, group deliberation will produce
significant shifts in individual judgments. Undoubtedly legislative behavior is affected by
mechanisms of this sort, and it is likely that many movements within judicial panels can
be explained in similar terms.
Are rhetorical advantages unhelpful or damaging? In the abstract, this is an
impossible question to answer, because shifts have to be evaluated on their merits.257
Perhaps the higher punitive awards that follow deliberation are simply better. So too,
perhaps, for the movements by doctors, taking more heroic measures, and by groups
deciding how equally to spread funds. The only point is that such advantages exist; and it
would be most surprising if they were always benign.
F. More Extremism, Less Extremism
Group polarization is not a social constant. It can be increased or decreased, and
even eliminated, by certain features of group members or their situation.
1. Antecedent extremism. Extremists are especially prone to polarization. It is
more probable that they will shift and it is probable that they will shift more. When they
start out an extreme point and are placed in a group of like-minded people, they are likely
to go especially far in the direction with which they started.258 There is a lesson here
about the sources of terrorism and political violence in general.259 And because there is a
link between confidence and extremism, the confidence of particular members also plays
an important role; confident people are more prone to polarization.260
2. Solidarity and affective ties. If members of the group think that they have a
shared identity, and a high degree of solidarity, there will be heightened polarization.261
One reason is that if people feel united by some factor (for example, politics or religious
convictions), dissent will be dampened. If individual members tend to perceive one
another as friendly, likable, and similar to them, the size and likelihood of the shift will
257
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increase.262 The existence of affective ties reduces the number of diverse arguments and
also intensifies social influences on choice.263 One implication, noted above, is that
mistakes are likely to be increased when group members are united mostly through bonds
of affection and not through concentration on a particular task; it is in the former case that
alternative views will less likely find expression.264 Hence people are less likely to shift if
the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly group members.265 A sense of
“group belongingness” affects the extent of polarization.266 In the same vein, physical
spacing tends to reduce polarization; a sense of common fate and intragroup similarity
tend to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival “outgroup.”267
An interesting experiment attempted to investigate the effects of group
identification.268 Some subjects were given instructions in which group membership was
made salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas others were not (the
“individual” condition). For example, subjects in the group immersion condition were
told that their group consisted solely of first-year psychology students, and that they were
being tested as group members rather than as individuals. The relevant issues involved
affirmative action, government subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized
industries, and phasing out nuclear power plants .The results were quite striking.269
Polarization generally occurred. But there was the least polarization in the individual
condition; polarization was greater in the group immersion condition, when group
identity was emphasized. This experiment strongly suggests that polarization is highly
likely to occur, and to be most extreme, when group membership is made salient.
3. Exit. Over time, group polarization can be fortified because of “exit,” as
members leave the group because they reject the direction in which things are heading.270
If exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism will be greatly aggravated. The group will
end up smaller, but its members will be both more like-minded and more willing to take
extreme measures; and that very fact will mean that internal discussions will produce
more extremism still. If only loyalists stay, the group’s median member will be more
extreme, and deliberation will produce increasingly extreme movements.
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4. Informed members and facts. When one or more people in a group know the
right answer to a factual question, the group is likely to shift in the direction of
accuracy.271 If the question is how many people were on the earth in 1940, or the number
of home runs hit by Hank Aaron, or the distance between Chicago and New York, and if
one or a few people know the right answer, the group is likely not to polarize, but to
converge on that answer. The reason is simple: The person who knows the answer will
speak with confidence and authority, and is likely to be convincing for that very reason.
Of course this is not inevitable; Asch’s conformity experiments show that social
pressures can lead to errors even with respect to simple factual claims. But in many cases,
group members who are ignorant will be tentative, and members who are informed will
speak confidently. This is enough to ensure convergence on truth rather than polarization.
Here there is a link between what prevents polarization and what shatters cascades: A
person who knows, and is known to know, the truth.
In this light it becomes easier to understand the outcomes of experiments that
show a potential advantage of groups over individuals.272 One set of experiments
involved two analytic tasks. The first involved a statistical problem, requiring subjects to
guess the composition of an urn containing blue balls and red balls. (This experiment
involved team decision-making and was not a test for cascade effects.) The other
involved a problem in monetary policy, asking participants to manipulate the interest rate
to steer the economy. People were asked to perform as individuals and in groups. The
basic results for the two experiments were similar. Groups significantly outperformed
individuals (and they did not, on balance, take longer to make decision). Perhaps most
surprisingly, there were no differences between group decisions made with a unanimity
requirement and group decisions made by majority rule. How can these results be
explained? The experimenters do not have a complete account. An obvious possibility is
that each group contained one or more strong analysts, who are able to move the group in
the right direction. But a series of regressions, comparing the performance of the best
individual players offers only mixed support for this hypothesis.273 It seems that in these
experiments, group results were driven by the best points and arguments, which would be
spread among the various individual players. Here we find a tribute to Aristotle’s
suggestion that groups can do much better than individuals.274
5. Equally opposed subgroups. Depolarization, rather than polarization, will be
found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two
extremes.275 Thus if people who initially favor caution are put together with people who
initially favor risk-taking, the group judgment will move toward the middle. Consider a
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study276 consisting of six-member groups specifically designed to contain two subgroups
(of three persons each) initially committed to opposed extremes; the effect of discussion
was to produce movement toward the center. One reason may be the existence of
partially shared persuasive arguments in both directions.277 Interestingly, this study of
equally opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure matters of fact
(e.g., the population of the United States in 1900)—and the least depolarization with
highly visible public questions (e.g., whether capital punishment is justified). Matters of
personal taste depolarized a moderate amount (e.g., preference for basketball or football,
or for colors for painting a room).278 Hence “familiar and long-debated issues do not
depolarize easily.”279 With respect to such issues, people are simply less likely to shift at
all, in part “because the total pool of arguments has long been familiar to all,”280 and
nothing new will emerge from discussion.
Compare in this regard an experiment designed to see how group polarization
might be dampened.281 The experiment involved the creation of four-person groups,
which, on the basis of pretesting, were known to include equal numbers of persons on
two sides of political issues (whether smoking should be banned in public places, whether
sex discrimination is a thing of the past, whether censorship of material for adults
infringes on human liberties). Judgments were registered on a scale running from +4
(strong agreement) to 0 (neutral) to –4 (strong disagreement). In half of the cases (the
“uncategorized condition”), subjects were not made aware that the group consisted of
equally divided subgroups in pretests. In the other half (the “categorized condition”),
subjects were told that they would find a sharp division in their group, which consisted of
equally divided subgroups. They were also informed who was in which group and told
that they should sit around the table so that one subgroup was on one side facing the other
group. In the uncategorized condition, discussion generally led to a dramatic reduction in
the mean gap between the two sides, thus producing a convergence of opinion toward the
middle of the two opposing positions (a mean of 3.40 scale points, on the scale of +4 to –
4). But things were very different in the categorized condition. Here the shift toward the
median was much less pronounced, and frequently there was barely any shift at all (a
mean of 1.68 scale points). In short, calling attention to group membership made people
far less likely to shift in directions urged by people from different groups.
**

**

**

**

**

**

**

My discussion of group influences—of conformity, cascades, and polarization—is
now complete. I have emphasized many findings from social science, but I have tried at
the same time to give a sense of how those findings bear on issues in law and politics. It
should be clear that there is a long list of potential applications, and any set of selections,
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from that list, is inevitably arbitrary. In the discussion that follows, I emphasize four
areas in which an understanding of group influences helps to illuminate legal problems.
The first involves law’s expressive function—the circumstances in which a mere
statement, made by the law, is likely to affect people’s behavior. I draw a link among
legal pronouncements, Milgram’s experimenter, and Asch’s unanimous confederates.
The second involves the institutions of the American Constitution, based on the founding
enthusiasm for the expression of diverse and dissenting views. I suggest that the
American Constitution creates a deliberative democracy of a distinctive kind—a
deliberative democracy that prizes heterogeneity. The third area involves the value of
dissent in a place not always thought to benefit from it: the federal judiciary. Because
judges are subject to conformity and cascade effects as well as group polarization, it is
exceedingly important to promote ideological diversity within the federal courts. The
fourth and final area involves affirmative action in higher education. Here I offer an
ambivalent lesson, suggesting that racial diversity is, in some domains, unimportant for
the exchange of (relevant) ideas, but that it is important in other domains, usually
involved in both undergraduate and law school education.
V. The Expressive Function of Law
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of law’s expressive
function—of the role of law in “making statements,” as opposed to regulating conduct
directly through actual punishments for violations.282 In this Part, I make three
suggestions. First, we can better understand the expressive function of law if we see
certain legal enactments as offering signals about what it is right to do and about what
other people think it is right to do. Second, a legal expression is most likely to be
effective if violations are highly visible; visibility matters because people do not want to
incur the wrath of others . Third, a legal expression is most likely to be ineffective if
violators are part of a deviant subcommunity which rewards, or at least does not punish,
noncompliance. In such cases, behavior within the subcommunity can counteract the
effects of law. Each of these points can be closely connected with an understanding of
conformity, cascades, and group polarization. We can thus use that understanding to see
when government might bring about compliance without relying on public
enforcement—and also when enforcement is likely to be indispensable.
A. Law As Signal
Sometimes law is infrequently enforced, but there is automatic or near-automatic
compliance.283 It is in this sense that law seems to have an expressive function, making
statements and having effects merely by virtue of those statements. When effects occur, it
is because the law offers signals on both the informational and reputational sides. If law
is made by sensible people, and if law bans certain conduct, there is a good reason to
presume that the conduct should be banned. And when law bans certain conduct, there is
good reason to presume that other people think that the conduct should be banned. In
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either case, sensible people have fresh reason to do what the law asks them to do. Of
course the presumptions can be rebutted. Informed people might know that the law is
asking people to do something senseless, or not to do something sensible. They might
also know that most people, or most relevant people, actually reject the law. But if these
cases are the exception rather than the rule, we can have a better understanding of why
law will produce movement even if no one is enforcing it.
Consider, for example, an empirical study of bans on smoking in public places.284
The simplest lesson is that people comply with those bans even though they are hardly
ever enforced. The study finds that in three cities in California—Berkeley, Richmond,
and Oakland—there were very few complaints about violations. In Berkeley, the
responsible health department officials found it unnecessary to issue even a single formal
citation, and no cases were referred for prosecution.285 In restaurants in Richmond,
compliance was nearly 100%, with workplace compliance hovering between 75-85
percent.286 The level of compliance was also extremely high in Oakland, with the
exception of “certain restaurants in the Asian community where nearly all the patrons are
smokers.”287 High levels of compliance were also found in workplaces, high schools, and
fast-food restaurants.288 Other studies, involving as Cambridge and Winnipeg, Manitoba,
similarly find that bans on public smoking are almost entirely self-enforcing.289
This evidence suggests that a legal pronouncement can have the same effect as
Asch’s unanimous confederates. When a law bans smoking in public places, the
pronouncement carries information to the effect that it is wrong, all things considered, to
smoke in public places. Equally important, the law suggests that most people believe that
it is wrong to smoke in public places. And if most people think that it is wrong to smoke
in public places, would-be smokers are less likely to smoke, in part because they do not
want to be criticized or reprimanded. It follows that when law is effective when
unenforced, an important reason is the possibility of private enforcement. If violations
have a high degree of visibility, and risk the wrath of private enforcers, compliance might
well become widespread. “In contrast to violations of laws against driving and drinking,
narcotics use, and tax evasion, infractions of no-smoking rules in public places are
relatively visible . . . to an almost omnipresent army of self-interested, highly motivated
private enforcement agents—nonsmokers who resist exposure to tobacco smoke.”290 In
some cases, the law might even be equivalent to Milgram’s experimenter, with a
significant degree of authority even if no sanctions will be imposed. To the extent that the
experimenter’s authority comes from a perception of expertise, the law is closely
analogous.
We might think of the underlying laws as exercises in norm management—and
extremely inexpensive ones at that. They are inexpensive in the sense that taxpayer
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resources are unnecessary to produce compliance. And in the best cases, expressive law
might even start, shatter, or fuel a cascade. Once compliance begins, and is widely seen
as such (especially from “fashion leaders”), there might well be compliance cascades,
spurred by both informational and reputational influences. In the context of sexual
harassment and smoking, law does seem to have caught a wave—and to have enlarged it
significantly.291 A key point here is that the law was ahead, but not too far ahead, of the
public at large. If the law were not ahead of the public, it would add nothing, and in that
sense have no effect at all. But if the law moved too far ahead of the public, it could not
be effective without aggressive enforcement activity.292 And a law that is too far ahead of
the public is unlikely, for that very reason, to be aggressively enforced: Prosecutors and
jurors are unlikely to punish people when the public does not support punishment.293 Law
is most effective when it goes somewhat, but not too far, beyond people’s existing values.
Thus far I have emphasized the situation from the point of view of the would-be
violator. But a law has effects on private enforcers as well. In the absence of a legal ban,
people who object to smoking in public places might well be timid about complaining,
even if they find cigarette smoke irritating or worse. The same people are likely to be
energized by a supportive enactment, which suggests both that they are right and that
their beliefs are generally shared. With law on their side, they are less likely to appear to
be noisy intermeddlers invoking a parochial norm. Someone who complains about
speeding, or drunk driving, or smoking in public is far more likely to feel, or to be
perceived as, having a legitimate complaint if the law requires the behavior they seek.
Now of course this is not all of the picture. Among some people, the law has a high
degree of moral authority, greatly exceeding the shared but unenacted view of many
people.294 If this is the case, the law’s authority will extend well beyond that of Asch’s
unanimous confederates, and probably beyond that of Milgram’s experimenter as well.
But we cannot fully appreciate law’s moral authority without seeing it as intertwined with
the informational and reputational factors that I have been emphasizing.
B. The Preconditions of Norm Management
When will norm management work without significant enforcement activity?
When will it fail? Begin with the case of a rational person who is considering whether to
comply with the law. Among the relevant considerations are a) the likelihood of
enforcement, b) the magnitude of the punishment in the event of enforcement, c) the
reputational costs of violation, d) the reputational benefits of violation, e) the intrinsic
benefits of compliance (perhaps a refusal to smoke will have health benefits), and f) the
intrinsic costs of compliance (perhaps it is extremely pleasant to smoke, and extremely
unpleasant not to smoke). By varying any of these variables, government might be able to
achieve greater compliance. For present purposes, my emphasis is on c) and d).
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To know whether a legal pronouncement will be effective, a key point involves
the nature and extent of private enforcement. Recall that in the Asch experiments, the
level of error is significantly decreased when people’s answers are given anonymously,
and also when people are given a financial incentive to answer correctly. These findings
suggest that seemingly modest changes in social context can counteract the pressure to
conform. Consider in this light the close empirical association between visibility and
compliance without enforcement. Parking in places reserved for the handicapped, and
smoking in public, are easy to see and in both cases private enforcement is likely.295 By
contrast, tax violations and sex offenses tend to be invisible, and hence violators need not
worry so much, at the time of violation, about the risk of public opprobrium.
At the same time, law’s expressive function can be reduced or even counteracted
if there is private support for violations. “People will defy dominant norms or laws,
despite considerable risks of punishment, when they enjoy the social support of a ‘deviant
subculture’ that continues to endorse the validity of condemned behavior.”296 In such
cases, prospective violators are roughly in the position of peer-supported subjects in the
Milgram experiment—at least if they have strong reason, based on principle or selfinterest, not to comply. And if the law is perceived as senseless, private support for
violations can operate in the same way as a voice of reason in the Asch experiments.
Hence it is possible to find “deviant subcultures” in which violations of law are
effectively rewarded, through admiration and even a general increase in statute. It is also
possible to find subcultures in which those who comply with the law can be heavily
“taxed,” through ridicule, ostracism, or even violence. Drug use in the most obvious
example; gang violence sometimes occurs simply because it is expected and rewarded by
peers. Laws that are infrequently enforced will, in such communities, be highly
ineffective, because private enforcement is lacking, and indeed private forces push hard
against compliance. It is even possible to imagine noncompliance cascades; such
cascades can involve information, as people see the violations of others, perhaps
including dissident “fashion leaders.” They can also involve reputation, as people learn
that in the relevant community, there will be no loss in the good opinion of others, and
possibly some gain, for violations.
In this light it is easy to see why there is a great deal of compliance with legal
bans on parking in handicapped spaces and on smoking in public places, whereas there is
far less compliance with legal bans on certain sexual behavior and (in certain domains)
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the Internal Revenue Code.297 And it is also possible to understand the phenomenon of
civil disobedience. When those engaged in civil disobedience are able to reach a critical
mass, the law loses its authority, both as evidence of what should be done and as
evidence of what (reasonable) people think should be done. The authority of the law is
overcome by the authority of those engaged in disobeying the law. Here conformity
pressures, cascade effects, and group polarization strongly favor disobedience.
How might government handle the troublesome situations in which violations are
both invisible and widespread? One possible remedy would be to let people know (if it is
true) of the high current levels of voluntary compliance. Because people like to do what
others do, large effects can come from reminders that most people obey the law or avoid
harmful conduct. In fact there is evidence that taxpayers are far more likely to comply
with the tax law if they believe that most people pay their taxes voluntarily, and far less
likely to do so if they believe that noncompliance is widespread.298 A similar example
may be drawn from college campuses. Students with a penchant for “binge drinking”
tend to believe that the number of binge drinkers is higher than it is in fact. When
informed of the actual numbers, they are less likely to persist in their behavior.299 These
examples suggest that an understanding of group influences, and of the information
conveyed by the acts of others, might be enlisted in efforts to reduce conduct that is
unlawful or otherwise dangerous to self and others.
VI. Institutions and Diversity
I now turn to issues of institutional design. As we have seen, the likelihood and
consequences of conformity, cascades, and group polarization very much depend on
institutional choices. Recall in particular that people are far more likely to reveal their
own information if they are rewarded for a correct group decision rather than for a correct
individual decision. In this Part, I begin with a brief note on the relationship between
dissent and war, with the suggestion that conformity, and suppression of dissent, can
undermine military preparedness. I also explore some of the institutions of the American
Constitution, suggesting that the founders’ largest theoretical contribution consisted in
their enthusiasm for diversity and the “jarring” of diverse views in government. Turning
to contemporary issues, I discuss the role of group influences on federal judges and the
dispute over “diversity” as a justification for affirmative action in higher education.
A. Dissent and War
I have suggested that an understanding of social influences increases appreciation
of the social role of whistleblowers and dissenters, many of whom sacrifice their own
self-interest and simultaneously benefit the public. Perhaps the most general point here
involves the role of diversity and dissent within democratic institutions. Consider the
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account of Luther Gulick, a high-level official in the Roosevelt Administration during
World War II. In 1948, shortly after the Allied victory, Gulick delivered a series of
lectures, unimaginatively titled Administrative Reflections from World War II, which
offered, in some detail, a set of observations about bureaucratic structure and
administrative reform.300 In a brief epilogue, Gulick set out to compare the warmaking
capacities of democracies with those of their Fascist adversaries.
Gulick began by noting that the initial evaluation of the United States, among the
leaders of Germany and Japan, was “not flattering.”301 We were, in their view, “incapable
of quick or effective national action even in our own defense because under democracy
we were divided by our polyglot society and under capitalism deadlocked by our
conflicting private interests.”302 Our adversaries said that we could not fight, and they
believed what they said. And dictatorships did seem to have real advantages. They were
free of delays, inertia, and sharp internal divisions. They did not have to reckon with the
opinions of a mass of citizens, some with little education and little intelligence.
Dictatorships could also rely on a single leader and an integrated hierarchy, making it
easier to develop national unity and enthusiasm, to master surprise, and to act vigorously
and with dispatch. But these claims, about the advantages of totalitarian regimes, turned
out to be “bogus.”303
The United States and its allies performed far better than Germany, Italy, and
Japan. Gulick linked their superiority directly to democracy itself, and in particular “to
the kind of review and criticism which democracy alone affords.”304 In a totalitarian
regime, plans “are hatched in secret by a small group of partially informed men and then
enforced through dictatorial authority.”305 Such plans are likely to contain fatal
weaknesses. By contrast, a democracy allows wide criticism and debate, thus avoiding
“many a disaster.” In a totalitarian system, criticisms and suggestions are neither wanted
nor heeded. “Even the leaders tend to believe their own propaganda. All of the stream of
authority and information is from the top down,” so that when change is needed, the high
command never learns of that need. But in a democracy, “the public and the press have
no hesitation in observing and criticizing the first evidence of failure once a program has
been put into operation.”306 In a democracy, information flows within the government—
between the lowest and highest ranks—and via public opinion. Of course dissent can be
muted in wartime, and for reasons I have discussed, this muting is a mixed blessing. If
everyone seems to be on the same page, morale may be strengthened; but if disagreement
is reduced, beneficial ideas—involving the nature, scope, justice, and wisdom of war—
may be absent.
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With a combination of melancholy and surprise, Gulick noted that the United
States and its allies did not show more unity than Germany, Japan, and Italy. “The
gregarious social impulses of men around the world are apparently much the same, giving
rise to the same reactions of group loyalty when men are subjected to the same true or
imagined group threats.”307 Top-down management of mass morale, by the German and
Japanese leaders, actually worked. Dictatorships were less successful in war, not because
of less loyalty or more distrust from the public, but because leaders did not receive the
checks and corrections that come from democratic processes.
Gulick is offering a claim here about how institutions perform better when
challenges are frequent, when people do not stifle themselves, and when information
flows freely.308 Of course Gulick is providing his personal account of a particular set of
events, and we do not really know if success in war is a product of democratic
institutions.309 The Soviet Union, for example, fought valiantly and well, even under the
tyranny of Stalin. But Gulick’s general theme contains a great deal of truth. Institutions
are far more likely to succeed if they contain mechanisms that subject leaders to critical
scrutiny and if they ensure that courses of action will be subject to continuing monitoring
and review from outsiders310—if, in short, they use diversity and dissent to reduce the
risks of error that come from social influences.
B. Constitutional Design
These points very much bears on the design of the American Constitution, which
attempts to create a deliberative democracy, that is, a system that combines accountability
to the people with a measure of reflection and reason-giving. 311 In recent years, many
people have discussed the aspiration to deliberative democracy. Their goal has been to
show that a well-functioning system attempts to ensure not merely electoral

307

Id.
In a less impressionistic vein but to the same effect, see Harrington, supra note; Janis, supra note.
309
Compare one of the most striking findings in the last half-century of social science: In the history of the
world, no society with democratic elections and a free press has ever experienced a famine. See Amartya
Sen, Poverty and Famines (1983). Famines are a product not merely of food scarcity, but of social
responses to food scarcity. A democratic government, checked by the press, is likely to take all reasonable
measures to prevent mass starvation, if only because it needs to do so to stay in office. At the same time, a
free society, facing the risk of famine, is likely to have a great deal of information, at every stage, about the
level of the emerging problem and the effectiveness of current or possible responses. If famine relief efforts
plans “are hatched in secret by a small group of partially informed men and then enforced through
dictatorial authority,” failure is far more likely. Or consider the problem of “witch-hunts” – mass
movements, led by political leaders, against internal conspiracies. As the McCarthy period demonstrates,
witch-hunts are hardly impossible in democracies. But they are far more likely in a system in which the
public is able to check the leaders’ claims about internal disloyalty. If civil liberties are protected, and if
information is permitted to flow, witch-hunts should be both less frequent and less damaging. See Vai-Lam
Mui, Information, Civil Liberties, and the Political Economy of Witch-hunts, 15 J Law, Economics, and
Org. 503 (1999).
310
See Bradley C. Karkkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s
Environmental Performance, 102 Colum L Rev 903, 948-62 (2002) (emphasizing need for and value of
continuing monitoring of environmental performance).
311
The best treatment is William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (1998).
308

59

responsiveness, but also an exchange of reasons in the public sphere.312 In a deliberative
democracy, the exercise of public power must be justified by reasons, not merely by the
will of some segment of society, and indeed not merely by the will of the majority. Both
the opponents and the advocates of the Constitution were firmly committed to political
deliberation. They also considered themselves “republicans,” committed to a high degree
of self-government.313 But deliberative democracies can come in many different forms,
The framers’ greatest innovation consisted not in their belief in deliberation, which
uncontested at the time, but in their fear of homogeneity, their enthusiasm for diversity,
and their effort to accommodate and to structure that diversity. In the founding period, a
large part of the nation’s discussion turned on the possibility of having that form of
government in a nation with its heterogeneous citizenry.
The antifederalists, opponents of the proposed Constitution, thought that this was
impossible. Thus Brutus, an especially articulate advocate of the antifederalist view,
spoke for the classical tradition when he urged: “In a republic, the manners, sentiments,
and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be constant
clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving
against those of the other.”314 The advocates of the Constitution believed that Brutus had
it exactly backwards. They welcomed the diversity and the “constantly clashing of
opinions” and affirmatively sought a situation in which “the representatives of one part
will be continually striving against those of the other.” Alexander Hamilton spoke most
clearly on the point, urging that the” differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in
[the legislative] department of the government . . . often promote deliberation and
circumspection; and serve to check the excesses of the majority.”315 From the standpoint
of political deliberation, the central problem is that widespread error and social
fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from others, move
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in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools and parochial influences.
A Constitution that ensures the “jarring of parties” and “differences of opinion” will
provide safeguards against unjustified movements of view.
A similar point emerges from one of the most illuminating early debates, raising
the question whether the bill of rights should include a “right to instruct” representatives.
That right was defended with the claim that citizens of a particular region ought to have
the authority to bind their representatives about how to vote. This defense might seem
plausible as a way of improving the political accountability of representatives—and so it
seemed to many at the time. But there is a problem with this view, especially in an era in
which political interest was closely aligned with geography. In such an era, it is likely
that the citizens of a particular region, influenced by one another’s views, might end up
with indefensible positions, very possibly as a result of its own insularity, leading to
cascade effects and group polarization. In rejecting the right to instruct, Roger Sherman
gave the decisive argument:
“[T]he words are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an idea that they
have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot be admitted to be just,
because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think, when the people have
chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union,
and consult, and agree with them on such acts as are for the general benefit of the whole
community. If they were to be guided by instructions, there would be no use in
deliberation.”316
Sherman’s words reflect the founders’ general receptivity to deliberation among
people who are quite diverse and who disagree on issues both large and small. Indeed, it
was through deliberation among such persons that “such acts as are for the general
benefit of the whole community” would emerge.
Most important, the institutions of the Constitution reflect a fear of group
influences, cascade effects, and polarization, creating a range of checks on ill-considered
judgments that emerge from those processes. The most obvious example is bicameralism,
designed as a safeguard against a situation in which one house—in the framers’ view,
most likely the House of Representatives—would be overcome by short-term passions
and even group polarization. This was the point made by Hamilton in endorsing a
“jarring of parties” within the legislature. James Wilson's great lectures on law spoke of
bicameralism very much in these terms, referring to "instances, in which the people have
become the miserable victims of passions, operating on their government without
restraint," and seeing a "single legislature" as prone to "sudden and violent fits of
despotism, injustice, and cruelty."317 To be sure, a cascade can cross the boundaries that
separate the Senate from the House; such crossings do occur. But their different
compositions and cultures provide a significant safeguard against warrantless cascades.
Here the Senate was thought to be especially important. Consider the widely reported
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story that on his return from France, Jefferson called Washington to account at the
breakfast-table for having agreed to a second chamber. "Why, asked Washington, "did
you pour that coffee into your saucer?" "To cool it," quoth Jefferson. "Even so," said
Washington, "we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it."318
We can understand many aspects of the system of checks and balances in the
same general terms. The duty to present legislation to the President protects against
cascade effects within the legislative branch.319 Because law cannot operate against
citizens without the concurrence of the legislative and executive branches, enacting and
then enforcing the law, there is a further safeguard against oppresion. Federalism itself
was, and remains, an engine of diversity, creating “circuit breakers” in the form of a
variety of sovereigns with separate cultures. In the federal system, social influences may
produce error in some states, and states can certainly fall into cascades.320 But the
existence of separate systems creates some check on the diffusion of error.321
Judicial power itself was understood in related terms, quite outside of the context
of constitutional review; consider Hamilton’s account322:
“But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the
independence of judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humours in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the
private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the
firmness of the judicial magistry is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and
confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves the moderate the immediate
mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the
legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an
iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner
compelled by the very motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their attempts.”
Of course the Constitution’s explicit protection of freedom of speech, and its
implicit protection of freedom of association,323 help to ensure spaces for diversity and
dissent. In that way, they counteract some of the risks of mistake that stem from group
influences. For present purposes, the analysis of free speech is straightforward, but it is
worth emphasizing that freedom of expression diminishes the gap between a nation’s
leaders and its citizens, and for that reason promotes monitoring of the former by the
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latter.324 James Madison, the author of the first amendment, used this point to object to
the whole idea of a “Sedition Act,” criminalizing certain forms of criticism of public
officials. Madison urged that “the right of electing the members of the Government
constitutes . . . the essence of a free and responsible government,” and that the “value and
efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of
the candidates for the public trust.”325 If group influences are kept in mind, one
implication is that government might in some settings have a legitimate interest in
introducing diversity of opinion into domains that that otherwise consist of like-minded
people. The reason is simply to diminish the risks of error. If modern technologies allow
people to sort themselves into congenial communities, there is a risk that people will be
insulated from competing views.326 Perhaps government should be entitled to respond. Of
course any such efforts, on government’s part, will introduce first amendment problems
of its own.327
Freedom of association presents some important wrinkles. An understanding of
group polarization suggests that associational freedom can produce significant risks,
above all because like-minded people might, by the laws of social interactions, end up in
unjustifiably extreme directions. Society might well become fragmented as a result of
“iterated polarization games,” in which groups of like-minded people—initially different,
but not terribly different, from one another—drive their members toward increasingly
diverse positions. Small differences in initial views might well be magnified, through
social interactions, into very large ones.328 An advantage of this process is that serves to
increase society’s stock of “argument pools”; but it also increases the likelihood of
mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and even hatred. At the same time, freedom of
association helps to counteract the informational and reputational influences that might
well lead people to fail to disclose information, preferences, and values. By allowing a
wide diversity of communities, imposing pressures of quite different kinds, freedom of
association increases the likelihood that at some point, important information will be
disclosed and eventually spread.329
Nothing in this brief account means that the American Constitution, as originally
ratified or as now understood, contains the ideal institutions and rights for balancing
diversity with other goals, including stability. Some people, for example, argue on behalf
of proportional representation,330 either of demographic groups or of a large number of
parties, and it is possible to understand those arguments as responsive to the goal of
guaranteeing a wide range of ideas in government. Efforts to ensure that disadvantaged
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groups are represented as such might be urged on this ground.331 In some nations, there
have been serious attempts to ensure equal representation for women, in large part on the
ground that without such representation, important points of view will be absent. There is
much to be said about this large topic.332 But to anchor the discussion, I now turn to two
more particular issues, both of considerable contemporary concern: diversity on the
federal judiciary and affirmative action in higher education.
C. Judges
1. Data. Are judges subject to conformity effects? Are they likely to cascade? Do
like-minded judges move to extremes? What is the effect of anticipated and actual
dissents? For obvious reasons this is not an easy topic to investigate. But consider judicial
behavior on the D.C. Circuit.333 A panel of three Republican judges is far more likely to
strike down agency action, at the behest of industry, than a panel of two Republicans and
one Democrat. At the individual level, group influences are at least equally striking:
When sitting with two Republicans, a Democratic judge is more likely to vote to strike
down agency action than is a Republican when sitting with two Democrats. It does not
much matter whether the judge of a single party is actually persuaded or instead decides
that it is simply not worthwhile to dissent publicly. In either case, the vote reflects social
influences, in a process that is not entirely different from what is observed in the Asch
experiments.334
Several studies find a strong tendency toward more extreme results when a panel
consists of judges from a single political party.335 The background fact is that when
industry challenges an environmental regulation, there is an extraordinary difference
between the behavior of a Republican majority and that of a Democratic majority.
Republican majorities reverse agencies over 50% of the time; Democratic majorities do
so less than 15% of the time.336 There are also significant findings of group influence.
Judges’ votes are greatly affected by whether there is another judge, on that panel,
appointed by a president from the same political party. A Republican judge is much more
likely to accept an industry challenge if she has a Republican colleague on the panel. A
Democratic judge is far less likely to accept such a challenge if she has a Democratic
colleague on the panel.337 Hence a single Democratic judge, accompanied by two
Republicans, votes in favor of industry challenges over 40% of the time; but when joined
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by one or more Democrats, the Democratic judge votes in favor of such challenges less
than 30% of the time.338
By contrast, a single Republican votes in favor of industry challenges less than
20% of the time.339 Remarkably, a single Republican, accompanied by two Democrats, is
less likely to accept an industry challenge than a single Democrat, accompanied by two
Republicans. This is a real testimony to the strength of group influences (and also judicial
reluctance to dissent publicly, either because it can be difficult and time-consuming to
produce a dissent or because dissenting can seem an antisocial act). It might seem
reasonable to say that a Democrat, sitting with two Republicans, votes like a Republican,
whereas a Republican, sitting with two Democrats, votes like a Democrat. This view is
not entirely wrong, but it is misleading. The problem is that how a Democrat votes, and
how a Republican votes, is very much a function of whether they are accompanied by one
or two people from their own party, or none at all.340 For this reason, there is no single
way, independent of group influences, that either a Republican or Democrat tends to
vote—at least in the context of industry challenges to agency regulations.
In a testimonial to group polarization, a panel of three Republican judges is far
more likely than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat to reverse an
environmental decision when industry challenges that decision.341 In one period (1995 to
2002), 71 percent of Republican votes, on all-Republican panels, accepted industry
challenges.342 By contrast, 45 percent of Republican votes, on two-to-one Republican
panels, accepted such challenges—and 37.5 percent of such votes did so on two-to-one
Republican panels.343 In a earlier period (1986-1994), the corresponding numbers were
80 percent, 48 percent, and 14 percent.344 In a still earlier period (1970-1982), 100
percent of Republicans votes, on all-Republican panels, were in favor of industry
challenges. By contrast, only 45 percent of Republican votes, on two-to-one Republican
panels, were in favor of industry challenges—and only 26 percent of Republican votes,
on Democratic-dominated panels, were in favor of such challenges.345
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Aggregating this data, we can produce a broadly representative and nearly
complete account of votes, within the DC Circuit, in environmental cases between 1979
and 2002. A simple calculation shows that in all-Republican panels, Republicans voted to
accept industry challenges 80 percent of the time; that in two-to-one Republican panels,
Republicans voted to accept such challenges 48 percent of the time; and that in two-toone Democratic panels, Republicans voted to accept industry challenges only 27.5 of the
time. And group polarization is hardly limited to Republican judges; it occurs among
Democratic judges as well. When an environmental group is challenging agency action, a
panel of three Democrats is more likely to accept the challenge than a panel of two
Democrats and one Republican.346 The likelihood that a Democrat will vote in favor of an
environmentalist challenge is highest when three Democrats are on the panel—and
lowest when the panel has two Republicans.347
A third study is more complicated.348 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chevron v. NRDC,349 courts are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of law so long
as the interpretations are “reasonable.” But when do courts actually uphold such
interpretations? The doctrine allows judges considerable room to maneuver, so that courts
that are inclined to invalidate agency action usually can find a plausible basis for doing
so. The real question is when they will claim to have found that plausible basis. The
second study strongly suggests that group influences play a role and that the potential for
a dissent, from a Democratic judge, is a strong deterrent to Republican judges who are
inclined to invalidate agency action. As a background fact, note that the study finds an
exceedingly strong influence, within the influential court of appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, of party affiliation on outcomes. If observers were to code cases very
crudely, by taking account of whether industry or a public interest group is bringing the
challenge, they would find that a majority of Republicans reach a conservative judgment
54% of the time, whereas a majority of Democrats reach such a judgment merely 32% of
the time.350
For present purposes, the most important finding is that there is a dramatic
difference between politically diverse panels, with judges appointed by Presidents of
more than one party, and politically unified panels, with judges appointed by Presidents
of only one party. On divided panels in which a Republican majority of the court might
be expected, on broadly speaking political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court
nonetheless deferred to the agency 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which an
all-Republican panel might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the
agency’s interpretation only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only such finding in
the data. When Democratic majority courts were expected to uphold the agency’s
decision on political grounds, they did so over 70% of the time, whether unified (71% of
the time) or divided (86% of the time). Consider the results in tabular form351:
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Uphold
agency action
Invalidate
agency action

3–0
Republican
panel

2–1
Republican
panel

3–0
Democratic
panel

2–1
Democratic
panel

33%

62%

71%

86%

67%

38%

29%

14%

It seems reasonable to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result—a 67 percent
invalidation rate when Republican judges are unified—reflects group influences and in
particular group polarization. A group of all-Republican judges might well take the
relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency’s interpretation, whereas a divided panel,
with a built-in check on any tendency toward the unusual or extreme outcome, is more
likely to take the conventional route. A likely reason is that the single Democratic judge
acts as a “whistleblower,” discouraging the other judges from making a decision that is in
tension with the Supreme Court’s command to uphold agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes.352 And other factors are involved. When a court consists of a panel of
judges with the same basic orientation, the median view, before deliberation begins, will
be significantly different from what it would be with a panel of diverse judges. The
argument pool will be very different as well. For example, a panel of three Republican
judges, tentatively inclined to invalidate the action of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), will offer a range of arguments in support of invalidation and relatively
few in the other direction—even if the law, properly interpreted, favors validation. If the
panel contains a judge who is inclined to uphold the EPA, the arguments that favor
validation are far more likely to emerge and to be pressed. Indeed, the very fact that the
judge is a Democrat increases the likelihood that this will occur, since that judge might
not think of himself as being part of the same “group” as the other panel members.
(Recall that when people are connected by ties of solidarity, disagreement is all the less
likely.) And because corroboration of opinion leads to greater confidence and hence
extremity, it is not surprising that a panel of three like-minded judges would lead to
unusual and extreme results.
In this context, the effect is fortified by the possibility that the sole judge, finding
himself outnumbered, might produce a dissenting opinion in public. To be sure, Supreme
Court review is rare and in the general run of cases, the prospect of such review probably
does not have much of a deterrent effect on courts of appeals. But judges who write
majority opinions are usually not enthusiastic about having to see and to respond to
dissenting opinions. And if the law actually favors the dissenting view, two judges, even
if they would like to reverse the Environmental Protection Agency, might be influenced
to adopt the easier course of validation. The evidence so suggests.353
A glance at the table immediately above offers some countervailing data: A panel
of three Democrats is not more likely than a panel with two Democrats to uphold agency
352
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action in cases in which Democrats might be expected to want to uphold the agency. And
in the context of a challenge from an environmental group, a Republican judge is not
likely to vote differently if he is accompanied by two Democrats, one Republican, or two
Republicans.354 But in some important domains, at least, a panel of three like-minded
judges will indeed behave differently from a panel with two. It would be most interesting
to learn what pattern would be observed in other contexts. What does the evidence show
if, in criminal cases, we compare panels of three Democratic judges with panels
containing two Democrats and one Republican? Are the three Democrats far more
inclined to reverse a criminal conviction than a panel with one Republican? In any case
the basic claim here can generate hypotheses about a wide range of areas. We might
hypothesize, for example, that all-Republican panels would not be enthusiastic about sex
discrimination claims, and that all-Democratic panels show far more sympathy for such
claims. Perhaps all-Democratic panels would be particularly skeptical about claims that
government regulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property without
just compensation. Perhaps all-Republican panels would show unusual enthusiasm for
such claims.
At this point a skeptic might note that lawyers make adversarial presentations
before judges. Such a skeptic might insist that the size of the “argument pool” is
determined by those presentations, not only and not even mostly by what members of the
panel are inclined to say and to do. And undoubtedly the inclinations of judges are
shaped, some of the time, by the contributions of advocates. But even if this is so, what
matters, for purposes of the outcomes, is the inclinations of judges, whatever they are
based on; and it is here that the existence of a single dissenter can make all the difference.
In the punitive damage study discussed above, mock juries were presented with
arguments from both sides, and polarization followed this presentation, as it has
elsewhere.355 Notice in this regard that for polarization hypothesis to hold, it is not
necessary to know whether judges spend a great deal of time offering reasons to one
another. Mere exposure to a conclusion is enough.356 A system of simple votes,
unaccompanied by reasons, should incline judges to polarize. Of course reasons, if they
are good ones, are likely to make those votes especially persuasive.
2. The normative issue. It remains to investigate the normative issues. If likeminded judges go to extremes, should we be troubled? Is it good if a large effect is found
from a single judge from a different party? More generally: Is there reason to attempt to
ensure diversity on the federal courts? To promote a degree of diversity on panels? There
is a widespread view that judges appointed by presidents of different political parties are
not fundamentally different and that once on the bench, judges frequently surprise those
who nominated them.357 The view is not entirely baseless, but it is misleading. Some
appointees do disappoint the Presidents who nominated them, but the availability
heuristic should not fool us into thinking that these examples are typical. Judges
appointed by Republican presidents are quite different from judges appointed by
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Democratic presidents. “Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review agency
discretion.”358
But it seems difficult to evaluate the underlying issues without taking a stand on
the merits—without knowing what we want judges to do. Suppose that three Republican
judges are especially likely to uphold criminal convictions, and that three Democratic
judges are especially likely to reverse those convictions. At first glance, one or the other
is troubling only if we know whether we approve of one or another set of results. In the
punitive damage study discussed above, the movement toward increased awards might be
something to celebrate, not to deplore, if we conclude that the median of predeliberation
awards is too low and that the increase, produced by group discussion, ensures more
sensible awards. And if a view about what judges should do is the only possible basis for
evaluation, we might conclude that those who prefer judges of a particular party should
seek judges of that party, and that group influences are essentially beside the point.
But the conclusion is too strong. In some cases, the law, properly interpreted,
really does argue strongly for one or another view. The existence of diversity on a panel
is likely to bring that fact to light and perhaps to move the panel’s decision in the
direction of what the law requires. The existence of politically diverse judges, and of a
potential dissent, increases the probability that the law will be followed. The Chevron
study, referred to above, strongly supports this point.359 The presence of a potential
dissenter—in the form of a judge appointed by a president from another political party—
creates a possible whistleblower who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless
decision.360 Through an appreciation of the nature of group influences, we can see the
wisdom in an old idea: A decision is more likely to be right, and less likely to be political
in a pejorative sense, if it is supported by judges with different predilections.
There is a further point. Suppose that in many areas, it is not clear, in advance,
whether the appointees of Democratic or Republican presidents are correct. Suppose that
we are genuinely uncertain. If so, there is reason to favor a situation in which the legal
system has both, simply on the ground that through that route, more (reasonable)
opinions are likely to be heard. And if we are genuinely uncertain, there is reason to favor
a mix of views merely by virtue of its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty,
sensible people choose between the poles.361
3. An analogy. Consider an analogy. Modern law and policy is often made by
independent regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the
Federal Communications Commission. Much of the time, such agencies act through
adjudication. They function in the same fashion as federal courts. And under federal
statutes, Congress has attempted to ensure that these agencies are not monpolized by
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either Democrats or Republicans. The law requires that no more than a bare majority of
agency members may be from a single party.362 An understanding of group influences
helps explain this requirement. An independent agency that is all-Democratic, or allRepublican, might move toward an extreme position, indeed a position that is more
extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme
than that of any agency official standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership
can operate as a check against movements of this kind. Congress was apparently aware of
this general point. Closely attuned to the policymaking functions of the relevant
institutions, it was careful to provide a safeguard against extreme movements.
Why do we fail to create similar safeguards for courts? Part of the answer must lie
in a belief that unlike heads of independent regulatory commissions, judges are not
policymakers. Their duty is to follow the law, not to make policy. An attempt to ensure
bipartisan composition would seem inconsistent with the commitment to this belief. But
the evidence I have discussed shows judges are policymakers of an important kind, and
that their political commitments very much influence their votes. In principle, there is
good reason to attempt to ensure a mix of perspectives within courts of appeals.
Of course the idea of diversity, or of a mix of perspectives, is hardly self-defining.
It would not be appropriate to say that the federal judges should include people who
refuse to obey the Constitution, or who refuse to exercise the power of judicial review, or
who think that the Constitution allows suppression of political dissent and racial
segregation. Here as elsewhere, the domain of appropriate diversity is limited. What is
necessary is reasonable diversity, or diversity of reasonable views, and not diversity as
such. People can certainly disagree about what reasonable diversity entails in this context.
All that I am suggesting here is that there is such a thing as reasonable diversity, and that
it is important to ensure that judges, no less than anyone else, are exposed to it, and not
merely through the arguments of advocates.
4. The Senate’s role. These points cast fresh light on a much disputed issue: the
legitimate role of the Senate in giving “advice and consent” to presidential appointments
to the federal judiciary. Above all, an understanding of social influences suggests that the
Senate has a responsibility to exercise its constitutional authority in order to ensure a
reasonable diversity of view. The Constitution’s history fully contemplates an
independent role for the Senate in the selection of Supreme Court Justices.363 That
independent role certainly authorizes the Senate to consider the general approach, and
likely pattern of votes, of potential judges. There can be no doubt that the President
considers the general approach of his nominees; the Senate is entitled to do so as well.
Under good conditions, these simultaneous powers would bring about a healthy form of
checks and balances, permitting each branch to counter the other. Indeed, that system is
part and parcel of social deliberation about the direction of the federal judiciary.
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Why might this view be rejected? It could be urged that there is only one
legitimate approach to constitutional or statutory interpretation—that, for example, some
version of originalism or textualism is the only such approach, and that anyone who
rejects that view is unreasonable. For true believers, it is pointless to argue for diverse
views.364 Diversity is not necessary, or even valuable, if we already know what should be
done, and if competing views would simply cloud the issue. (In a scientific dispute, it is
not helpful to include those who believe that the earth is flat.) Or it might be urged that a
deferential role for the Senate, combined with natural political competition and cycles,
will produce a sensible mix over time. I do not deny this possibility. My only suggestions
are that a high degree of diversity on the federal judiciary is desirable, that the Senate is
entitled to pursue diversity, and that without such diversity, judicial panels are will
inevitably go in unjustified directions.
D. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Countless educational institutions pursue the goal of diversity. Most of America’s
large private and public institutions seek a wide range of views, faculty, and students.
There are some prominent exceptions; some institutions pride themselves on a high
degree of homogeneity.365 And here as elsewhere, the idea of diversity needs to be
clarified. Colleges and universities do not make special efforts to include students who
collect Britney Spears memorabilia, hate America, smell bad, or have low SAT’s. Such
institutions are committed to diversity, but only to a certain degree and of a certain kind.
It remains possible to urge, as many do, that they give excessive attention to diversity of
some kinds and insufficient attention to diversity of other kinds. The only point I am
making here is that they tend to be committed to diversity of a recognizable sort.
There are many reasons for this commitment. One involves simple market
pressures; a school that has different sorts of students is more likely to be able to attract
good faculty and good students.366 Of course people’s preferences and values vary, and
some people want to go to places that are relatively homogeneous. But this seems to be
the exception rather than the rule.367 And there is another justification for diversity, one
that has received considerable attention within courts368 and that is closely related to my
topic here. The idea is that education is simply likely to be better if the school has people
364
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with different views, perspectives, and experiences. In the context of affirmative action,
this justification was approved in Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in the Bakke case,369
an opinion that has the unusual distinction of having settled, for a period of decades, the
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education without having been embraced
by any other justice on the Supreme Court. My goal here is to offer a qualified defense of
Justice Powell’s view. I urge that in some educational settings, racial diversity is
important for ensuring a broad array of experiences and ideas, and that in those settings,
narrowly tailored affirmative action programs should be constitutionally permissible.
Justice Powell insisted that a diverse student body is a constitutionally acceptable
goal for higher education.370 The central reason is that universities should be allowed to
ensure a “robust exchange of ideas,” an interest connected with the first amendment
itself.371 Justice Powell acknowledged that this interest seemed strongest in the context of
undergraduate education, where views are formed on a large number of topics. But even
in a medical school, “the contribution of diversity is substantial.”372 A medical student
having a particular background, including a particular ethnic background, “may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training
of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital
service to humanity.”373 Justice Powell also emphasized that doctors “serve a
heterogeneous population,” and suggested that graduate admissions decisions are
concerned with contributions that follow formal education.374
Thus Justice Powell concluded that the crucial question was whether a raceconscious admission program, giving benefits to people because they are members of
racial minority groups, was a necessary means of promoting the legitimate goal of
diversity. Here he reached his famous conclusion that racial or ethnic background could
be a “plus” in the admissions decision, though quotas would not be allowed.375 For
Justice Powell, a legitimate admissions program should be “flexible enough to consider
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of the applicant,
and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily
according to them the same weight.”376 Thus it would be acceptable to promote
“beneficial educational pluralism” by considering a range of factors, including
“demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”377
My central concern here is the principal378 basis for Justice Powell’s conclusion:
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the value of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas” in the classroom, and the legitimacy of
promoting racial diversity in order to ensure that exchange. To understand the
contemporary relevance of Justice Powell’s opinion, it is necessary to outline the recent
developments in the constitutional principles governing affirmative action programs. The
Court has now settled on the view that affirmative action programs, like all other
programs embodying racial discrimination, should be subject to “strict scrutiny” from
courts, and invalidated unless they are the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest.379 It is also clear that past “societal discrimination,” meaning
discrimination in the nation’s past, is not a legitimate basis for discrimination against
whites.380 It is equally clear that narrow, remedial affirmative action programs are
acceptable if they are specifically designed to correct for proven past discrimination by
the institution that is acting affirmatively.381
What remains unclear is when, if ever, a public institution is permitted to justify
affirmative action by reference to “forward-looking” justifications, not involving a
remedy for past discrimination.382 A state might, for example, try to defend affirmative
action in hiring police by urging that a police force will simply be more effective if it
contains African-Americans among others—especially in a community that contains
people of multiple races.383 Justice Powell was really offering a similar claim about
higher education: Whether or not a college or university has itself discriminated against
African-Americans or others, it should permitted to discriminate in favor of them if it is
doing so as a means of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas.” But current justices have
given conflicting signals about the legitimacy and strength of forward-looking
justifications.384
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There can be no doubt that universities are permitted to promote diversity and
dissent by seeking a mix of faculty and students. Efforts of this kind are pervasive; this is
what most admissions offices try to do. To be sure, some serious free speech issues might
be raised if an admissions office discriminates in favor of, or against, particular points of
view.385 But even if public institutions are barred from pursuing diversity of ideas by
discriminating directly against some points of view, such institutions are surely
permitted, without offending the first amendment, to seek a variety of backgrounds and
experiences, in the hope that better discussions will result. If Justice Powell is right,
affirmative action programs can be similarly justified. The simple idea here is that diverse
populations are likely to increase the range of thoughts and perspectives, and to reduce
the risks of conformity, cascades, and polarization associated with group influences.386
We have seen that on the judiciary, judges with diverse views can act as
“whistleblowers,” correcting ill-considered views of the law. In educational institutions, a
high degree of diversity, including racial diversity, often has the same effect. A racially
uniform class is all too likely to polarize to an unjustified position, simply because
students’ antecedent views are not subject to critical scrutiny.
For example, we can easily imagine all-white classrooms, discussing the issue of
racial profiling, in which the absence of racial diversity is a serious problem. Those who
have not had bad experiences, as a result of such profiling, will lack crucial information.
Return here to Justice O’Connor’s comments on Justice Marshall: “Justice Marshall
brought a special perspective. . . . His was the mouth of a man who knew the anguish of
the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . I have been perhaps most personally affected by
Justice Marshall as a raconteur . . . . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch
myself looking expectantly for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just
once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the
world.”387 What was true for Justice O’Connor is true for white students in many
educational settings. In the context of racial profiling, and in many other imaginable
cases, a degree of racial diversity is likely to bring to bear valuable information and
perspectives. These may change how the group sees the world, whether or not it leads to
O'Connor, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 US 547, 612 (1990), joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Kennedy: “Modern equal protection has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the
effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly
not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate
basis for employing racial classifications.”
385
I am unaware of any first amendment challenge to a university’s efforts to promote diversity by
promoting a range of views, even though such efforts would necessarily involve discrimination against
some views and in favor of others. But there are some hard questions lurking here. One set of questions
involve the sheer difficulty of proof: In a case in which a student is or is not denied admission, the
applicant’s political view will undoubtedly be one of a range of factors, and it will be hard to isolate, in a
challenge, point of view as the decisive factor. In a case of discharge or suspension as a result of political
view, there would indeed be a constitutional problem. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 US 563, 568
(1968).
386
For supportive evidence, see Patricia Gurin, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan:
the Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 Mich J Race & Law 363 (1999).
387
See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Reconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217,
1217, 1220 (1992).

74

a different conclusion on the merits.
To say this is of course not to make the absurd claim that white people all agree
with one another about racial profiling, or that African-Americans have the same
experiences and opinions about that complex issue. And in light of the fact that members
of all races contain people with a range of both favorable and unfavorable views about
racial profiling, it would be possible to respond that any problem, if it exists, is not
because the group is all-white, but if and because its members begin with a uniform view
of racial profiling. And if this is so, what, if anything, is added by promoting diversity not
of views but of racial background? The answer must be that African-Americans, by virtue
of their experience, are able to add something to the discussion as such. And this seems
far from implausible. If students need to know something about the magnitude and the
experience of racial profiling, those who have been subject to such profiling will be able
to offer novel insights. And if African-Americans do, in fact, have an unusually high
degree of hostility to racial profiling, that is by itself a point worthwhile to know and to
try to understand. So too if they do not show such hostility. Of course supplemental
readings could be used to expose people to diverse views. The value of diversity lies not
simply in learning about facts, but also in seeing a range of perspectives, including the
emotions attached to them—and in being in the actual physical presence of those who
have those perspectives, and perhaps cannot be easily dismissed.
These points might be used by a purportedly nondiscriminatory institution to
defend a set of policies designed to ensure a reasonable diversity of view in classroom
discussions. Because of the importance of a wide range of ideas to the educational
enterprise, the goal seems both legitimate and compelling. Are affirmative action
programs the least restrictive means of promoting that goal? The answer depends on the
nature of those programs. It is easy to imagine cautious efforts, using race as a factor, in
which the “least restrictive means” test is indeed satisfied.388 And that point is sufficient
to suggest that Justice Powell’s approach is essentially correct.
To be sure, the same arguments about the importance of diverse views might be
enlisted very broadly, and in circumstances that might seem unattractive. Imagine, for
example, an effort, by a mostly African-American university, to point to the need for
diversity as a way of defending discrimination against African-Americans and in favor of
whites. Such a university might claim that it wants significant representation by whites in
order to reduce the risks from group influences and to improve the quality of discussion.
It does indeed follow, from what I have said thus far, that this argument is legitimate. A
classroom that is entirely African-American might well suffer from conformity effects
and polarization; and a educational institution might want to correct the situation. If
courts should be suspicious of the argument in this context, it is because they do not trust
the sincerity of those who make it. Courts might believe that the reference to diversity is
actually a pretext for an illicit discriminatory motive. But it is easy to imagine cases in
which diversity is the real concern and no pretext is involved.
388
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There is a further complexity. Suppose that a university claims that it is pursuing
the goal of high-quality education. Suppose that it insists that its admissions policies,
which place a premium on many forms of diversity, are a legitimate means of pursuing
that goal. Such a university might well be willing to discriminate in favor of members of
racial minorities—and might well claim that this form of discrimination is part of the
neutral pursuit of high-quality education. Is this illegitimate? Outside the context of
affirmative action, the Court has come very close to holding that it is.389 In making
decisions about child custody, courts are prohibited from taking account of the possible
prejudice to be faced by children of racially mixed couples. The prohibition applies even
if it is defended as part of a neutral mechanism for promoting the welfare of the child.390
A racially-based system of child custody cannot be justified on the ground that in light of
existing social values, children do better in a family that is all-white or all-AfricanAmerican. This decision suggests that an institution is not permitted to defend otherwise
illegitimate discrimination by suggesting that it is neutrally pursuing a more abstract
goal.391 But I am not claiming here that affirmative action fails to count as discrimination.
I am urging instead that affirmative action can be adequately justified, in some contexts,
as a way of ensuring that educational institutions do what they are supposed to do.
It is important to emphasize the narrowness of the argument I am making. In some
cases, racial diversity is important for improving the educational process within the
relevant school. But in some cases, the claim seems extremely weak. Would a
mathematics class, or a course in physics, be improved if it contained a degree of racial
diversity? This seems unlikely. In principle, I do not believe that courts should use the
Constitution to scrutinize affirmative action programs with great care.392 But the law is
otherwise, and if courts are going to do so, they should not offer a blanket ruling for or
against a diversity rationale in higher education. They should accept that rationale in the
context of undergraduate education, but not for programs for which racial diversity is not
necessary to promote a “robust exchange of ideas.” In the context of law school, the
centrality of racial issues to important aspects of legal education should be enough to
allow narrowly tailored affirmative action programs to survive constitutional scrutiny.393
Conclusion
Human beings pay close attention to the informational and reputational signals
sent by others. These signals produce conformity, even in cases in which many people
have reason to believe, on the basis of their private information, that others are mistaken
or worse. Informational and reputational influences also produce cascades, in which
people do not rely on, and fail to disclose, the information that they themselves have.
Cascades and errors occur spontaneously when people rationally take account of the
389
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decisions and statements of their predecessors. Errors are magnified when people are
rewarded for conformity—and minimized when people are rewarded, not for correct
individual decisions, but for correct decisions at the group level.
Cascades, like conformity, are not a problem in themselves. Sometimes cascades
produce good outcomes, at least compared to a situation in which people rely solely on
their own information. The real problem is that when cascades are occurring, people do
not disclose information from which others would benefit. The result is that both
individuals and groups can blunder, sometimes catastrophically. Institutions involved in
making, enforcing, and interpreting the law are subject to conformity and cascade effects.
The executive branch has been shown to blunder as a result.394 We have seen that within
courts, precedential cascades are highly likely, especially in complex areas; and in such
areas, cascades tend to be both self-perpetuating and self-insulating.
The general lesson is clear. It is extremely important to devise institutions that
attempt to promote disclosure of private views and private information. Institutions that
reward conformity are prone to failure to the extent that they do not do that; institutions
are far more likely to prosper if they create a norm of openness and dissent. The point
very much bears on the risks of group polarization. Groups of like-minded people are
likely to go to extremes, simply because of limited argument pools and reputational
considerations. The danger is that the resulting movements in opinion will be unjustified.
It is extremely important to create “circuit breakers”395 and to devise institutional
arrangements that will serve to counteract movements that could not be supported if
people had a wider range of information.
These points have implications for numerous issues in law and policy. I have
focused on a small subset of those issues here. We have seen that an appreciation of
social influences casts new light on the expressive function of law. Simply by virtue of
what it says, and even if it is rarely enforced, law can affect the behavior of those who are
unsure whether to engage in certain conduct—and also the behavior of those who are
unsure whether to challenge those who engage in that conduct. Bans on smoking in
public and on sexual harassment are cases in point. Law’s effectiveness, in this regard,
lies in its power to give a signal about what it is right to do, and also to dissipate
pluralistic ignorance, by providing information about what other people think that it is
right to do. A legal enactment can operate in the same fashion as Asch’s confederates and
Milgram’s experimenter. Because people care about the reactions of others, law’s
expressive function will be heightened if the relevant conduct is visible; bans on smoking
in public places are an obvious example. For the same reason, that function will be
weakened if prospective law-breakers live in a supportive subcommunity; consider bans
on the use of narcotics. With an understanding of social influences, we can therefore
make some predictions about when law is likely to be effective merely by virtue of what
it says—and about when law will be ineffective unless it is accompanied by vigorous
enforcement activity.
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I have suggested that many of the Constitution’s institutions serve to reduce the
likelihood of bad consequences from conformity, cascades, and group polarization. Such
institutions increase the likelihood that important information, and alternative points of
view, will receive a public airing. The system of bicameralism is the most obvious
example, producing a system in which lawmaking is done by two institutions with
different cultures, thus creating a potential check on unjustified movements. I have also
urged that the framers’ most distinctive contribution consisted not in their endorsement of
deliberative democracy, which was uncontroversial, but in their commitment to
heterogeneity in government, seeing (in Hamilton’s words) the “jarring of parties” as a
method for “promoting deliberation.”
More controversially, I have suggested that an understanding of social influences
suggests the importance of ensuring a high degree of diversity on the federal bench. It is
foolish to pretend that Republican appointees do not, as a class, differ from Democratic
appointees; and we have reason to appreciate the value, on any panel, of having a
potential “whistleblower,” in the form of one judge of a different party from the other
two. Of course judges are rarely lawless, but a group of like-minded judges is prone to go
to extremes. An appreciation of social influences on belief and behavior also supports the
legitimacy of efforts to promote racial diversity in higher education, at least where such
diversity is likely to improve learning.
Even if occasionally alarming, much of the behavior discussed here attests to the
reasonableness and good sense of ordinary people. In the face of doubt, we do well to pay
attention to the views of others.396 After all, they might know better than we do. It is
prudent to be cautious about challenging other people, not only because they might be
right, but also because people do not always like to be challenged. Even in the most
freedom-loving societies, people dissent at their peril. A reluctance to disagree is not
merely prudent; it is often courteous too. But conformity creates serious dangers.
Behavior that is sensible, prudent, and courteous is likely to lead individuals and societies
to blunder, simply because people fail to learn about facts or opinions from which they
would benefit.
It is usual to think that those who conform are serving the general interest and that
dissenters are antisocial, even selfish. In a way this is true. In some settings, conformists
strengthen social bonds, whereas dissenters imperil them, or at least introduce tension.
But in an important respect, the usual thought has things backwards. Much of the time, it
is in the individual’s interest to follow the crowd, but in the social interest for the
individual to say and do what he thinks best. Well-functioning systems of law and
politics take steps to discourage conformity and to promote dissent, partly to protect the
rights of dissenters, but mostly to protect interests of their own.
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